

For a New Partnership in the New Century: The Relationship between the OSCE, NATO and the EU

Introduction

What is the role of the OSCE in relation to the major security-related organizations in Europe? Relations between international organizations are, as a rule, based on both co-operation and competition. This is the case particularly when the mandate and tasks of organizations encompass the same or similar spheres of activity. Co-operation finds its expression in official documents, agreements and declarations, and competition is reflected in day-to-day praxis, particularly at medium and lower levels. Occasionally it takes the shape of overtly critical positions addressed by one institution to the other; more common, however, is to mutually diminish the role and importance of rival organizations or merely ignore one another. Among the existing multi-lateral institutions and structures in Europe, the OSCE can be singled out by three major elements.

First, it is a universal, pan-European organization, embracing all states of Europe, Central Asia (former Soviet republics) and North America. In total, it includes 55 participating States. In that sense, it is the only security-related institution in Europe based on the principle of inclusiveness.

Second, all substantial OSCE decisions are adopted by consensus.

Third, the OSCE is the most comprehensive security structure in existence: its activity covers virtually all aspects of the international life - political relations, security issues including CSBMs and conventional arms reductions, human rights problems, humanitarian matters, economic issues, protection of the environment, transportation, tourism, people-to-people contacts, information, culture and education.

In the view of numerous commentators, because of these features, the OSCE has a weak image or some would label it a fair-weather organization. This conclusion stems from the argument that strong organizations should not be universal and inclusive. They should not cover too many dimensions and their decisions should not rest on consensus. Therefore, one of the main arguments of the opponents of extending NATO and the European Union to the east is that enlargement of both structures would lead to their inevitable political weakening and organizational erosion. Consensus, in turn, would hamstring their strategic decision-making processes, as is the case of the UN Security Council.

The starting point of the discussion presented below is an assumption that what is blamed as factors causing the weakness of the OSCE are in fact its strength, quality and importance in the shaping of the European security sys-

tem. The OSCE is part of the process initiated 25 years ago with the aim of carrying out peaceful transformation. CSCE/OSCE decisions and activities were an answer to the question: How can the change be managed? Indeed, one can give credit to the Helsinki process for the fact that the complex problems of domestic system transformation in the states of the former Eastern bloc were managed peacefully and that Central and Eastern Europe was able to release itself from the subjugation to the Soviet Union. The implementation of the right of nations to self-determination and the achievement of independence by the former Soviet republics as well the whole process of armaments reductions in Europe did not slip out of control thanks to the effectiveness of the procedures and mechanisms agreed upon in the 1975 CSCE Final Act and the 1990 Paris Charter for A New Europe. In 1992 in Helsinki, these procedures and mechanisms were addressed with the aim of reassessing their role and adequacy in response to new risks and challenges.¹

New Tasks

The decisions of the July 1992 Helsinki Summit Meeting were of crucial importance for institutionalizing the CSCE process and mapping out a strategy for mutually reinforcing institutions for security in Europe. In Berlin, the foreign ministers had encouraged the exchange of information and relevant documents between the CSCE and other main European and transatlantic institutions.² In Prague, the list of CSCE relationships with international organizations had been expanded to embrace the Council of Europe, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), NATO, the WEU, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB) "and other European and transatlantic organizations which may be agreed" upon with the aim of inviting them to make contributions to specialized CSCE meetings for which they have relevant expertise.³

At the Summit Meeting, the leaders of the participating States welcomed the rapid adaptation of European and transatlantic institutions which were "increasingly working together to face up to the challenges" before them and to

1 See more on this in: Adam Daniel Rotfeld, *The CSCE: towards a security organization*, in: SIPRI Yearbook 1993, Oxford et al. 1993, pp. 171-189.

2 In the Summary of Conclusions of the Berlin Meeting of the CSCE Council in June 1991, the following organizations were mentioned: the EC, the Council of Europe, the ECE, NATO and the WEU. Cf. Berlin Meeting of the CSCE Council, 19-20 June 1991, in: Arie Bloed (Ed.), *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993*, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1993, pp. 807-818, here: p. 808.

3 In the Prague Document, the Ministers requested that these organizations inform the CSCE Secretariat annually of their current work programme and of the facilities available for work relevant to the CSCE. See Prague Meeting of the CSCE Council, 30-31 January 1992, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 2), pp. 820-839, here: p. 837.

"provide a solid foundation for peace and prosperity".⁴ The Meeting laid down guidelines for CSCE co-operation with individual organizations. The Helsinki Document stated that the European Community, "fulfilling its important role in the political and economic development in Europe (...) is closely involved in CSCE activities". NATO, through NACC, "has established patterns of co-operation with new partners in harmony with the process of the CSCE. It has also offered practical support for the work of the CSCE".⁵ The WEU, stated the Helsinki Document, as an integral part of the development of the European Union, is "opening itself to additional co-operation with new partners and has offered to provide resources in support of the CSCE".⁶ A framework of co-operation was also established linking the CSCE with the Council of Europe, the Group of Seven (G7) and the Group of Twenty-Four as well as with the OECD, the ECE and the EBRD. The Helsinki Document also indicated possibilities for such regional and sub-regional organizations as the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Višegrád Triangle, the Black Sea Economic Co-operation, the Central European Initiative and the Commonwealth of Independent States to co-operate with and assist the CSCE. This list of diverse organizations reflected the excessive bureaucratization of multilateral relations among European, North American and Central Asian states; the duplication of the functions and tasks of these institutions and structures gave rise to the threat they would become more competitive and less compatible, more "inter-blocking" and less interlocking and more likely to weaken than to reinforce one another. Later developments showed that such fears were unfounded.

4 CSCE Helsinki Document 1992: *The Challenges of Change*, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 2), pp. 701-710, here: p. 702.

5 Ibid. Proposed by the NATO Rome Summit Meeting on 7-8 November 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was called into being on 20 December 1991 to establish a "liaison" between the Alliance and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Its declared goal is consultation and co-operation (but not guarantees) on security and related issues, such as defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civilian-military co-ordination of air traffic management and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes. Apart from the institutional structure (meetings at foreign minister, ambassadorial and other levels), an informal High-Level Working Group was established to redistribute the TLE ceilings in the CFE Treaty among the CIS states. This contributed to its successful conclusion. On 1 April 1992, the first meeting of NACC defence ministers took place; at this meeting it was agreed that a programme for further co-operation would be implemented on such defence-related matters as military strategies, defence management, the legal framework for military forces, harmonization of defence planning and arms control, exercises and training, defence education, reserve forces, environmental protection, air traffic control, search and rescue, military contribution to humanitarian aid and military medicine. As of 31 December 1992 there were 37 NACC member states (16 NATO, five CEE, 15 former Soviet republics plus Albania). The division of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic brought the number of member states to 38 on 1 January 1993. Finland attended the Oslo NACC meeting on 5 June 1992 as an observer.

6 Ibid. See also the Petersberg Declaration (19 June 1992) adopted at the WEU Council of Ministers Meeting. The Petersberg Declaration structures the WEU-Central European states' dialogue, consultations and co-operation with regard to the European security architecture and stability. See <http://www.weu.int/eng/comm/92-petersberg.htm>.

Finally the Heads of State or Government of the participating States declared their understanding that "the CSCE is a regional arrangement in the sense of chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations". No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements without the authorization of the UN Security Council. The Helsinki Document reaffirmed that the "rights and responsibilities of the Security Council remain unaffected in their entirety".⁷ For the first time an important link was established between the CSCE and the United Nations or, more broadly, between European and global security.

Managing the Change in the New Century

In 1999 European security developments were dominated by the NATO intervention in Kosovo (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and the war waged by Russian federal forces in Chechnya, part of the Russian Federation. In both cases the OSCE played an essential role in seeking ways of, first, preventing the use of force, and when this failed, settling the conflict situation peacefully. The decisions adopted in 1999 at the NATO summit in Washington and the EU summits in Cologne and Helsinki are of a special importance for the recognition of the new role of the OSCE in shaping a European security system.

In 1999 the OSCE expanded its operations considerably and strengthened its role as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict rehabilitation. New tasks were assumed in Central Asia, the Caucasus and South-eastern Europe. In total, OSCE long-term missions and other forms of field activities encompassed 25 different operations,⁸ supplemented by the work of such OSCE institutions as the High

7 Helsinki Document 1992, cited above (Note 4), p. 707. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter deals with regional arrangements (articles 52, 53 and 54). Article 52, para. 2, reads as follows: "The members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall value every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council." UN Office of Public Information, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, New York 1963, p. 28.

8 The OSCE missions and other field activities were developed in different forms and ways: the OSCE Presence in Albania; two Missions to Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Croatia; Missions of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina; the Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje (Macedonia); two Missions to Estonia and Latvia; the Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus; the Assistance Group to Chechnya (Russia); the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office on the conflict dealt with by the Minsk Conference (Nagorno-Karabakh); the OSCE Offices in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Missions to Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan; the OSCE Liaison Office in Central Asia (Uzbekistan); the OSCE Centres in Almaty (Kazakhstan), Ashgabad (Turkmenistan) and Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan); the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine; three types of activities in Kosovo - the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), the OSCE Task Force for Kosovo and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo; and two specific activities in Estonia and Latvia - on Military Pensioners and the Joint Committee on the Skruna Radar Station. For more detail, see OSCE, Secretary General, Annual Report 1999 on OSCE Activities (1 December 1998-31 October 1999), Vienna, 1999.

Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, the OSCE regional strategy and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.

At the OSCE Seminar on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model (Vienna, 18-19 September 1995), NATO's Assistant Secretary General Gebhardt von Moltke presented the Alliance's view on the future role of the OSCE and the guiding principles of the future security model. He also mentioned a number of things, which should be avoided in this type of security model:

- It should not cut across existing provisions and achievements of the OSCE or weaken any existing arms control and co-operative security achievements.
- It should not create status differences between OSCE participating States which could undermine their equal rights to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.
- It should not create strategic dividing lines nor be based on any notion of blocs.
- It should not prejudice the sovereign rights of states to belong to or to join security organizations in accordance with international law and the principles agreed upon by the OSCE.
- It should not undermine, directly or indirectly, the transatlantic security partnership embodied in the North Atlantic Alliance and integral to the OSCE.
- It should not encourage any institutional hierarchy.

He pointed out three specific areas central to the development of a security model, in which NATO can contribute significantly:

- (1) meeting military challenges, particularly through arms control and disarmament measures;
- (2) promoting security and stability in the OSCE area through the North Atlantic Co-operation Council and Partnership for Peace as well as the inclusion of new members in the Alliance;
- (3) implementing the concept of mutually reinforcing institutions adopted by the OSCE in Helsinki in 1992.

Four years later the new basic NATO document (1999), "The Alliance's Strategic Concept", defined the OSCE's role as follows: "The OSCE, as a regional arrangement, is the most inclusive security organisation in Europe, which also includes Canada and the United States, and plays an essential role in promoting peace and stability, enhancing cooperative security, and advancing democracy and human rights in Europe. The OSCE is particularly

active in the fields of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. NATO and the OSCE have developed close practical cooperation, especially with regard to the international effort to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia."⁹

A test of the OSCE's capabilities and limitations in 1999 was its role in the Balkans, in Kosovo in particular. In early 1999 it completed the establishment of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), which was launched by the Permanent Council on 25 October 1998 - to a great extent as a result of the efforts of US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke. By far the largest OSCE operation ever, it was withdrawn from Kosovo on 20 March 1999 because of the grave deterioration of the security situation and the erosion of its ability to accomplish its tasks. The brief history of the KVM demonstrated that the OSCE can play a key role only if it has the strong support of the major powers and the major European multilateral security institutions.

Following UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, a new OSCE mission was established within the UN Interim Administration. This mission has taken a leading role in the institution- and democracy-building process and human rights.¹⁰ Its responsibilities are unprecedented within the OSCE. Its work covers, among other things, the training of a new police service and judicial and administrative personnel.

In Kosovo, the OSCE interacts closely with the UN, NATO, the EU and the Council of Europe. Its experience in 1999 in the Balkans confirms the tendency towards a gradual expansion of its security role. This is also demonstrated in OSCE regional strategy and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

The EU initiative of 10 June 1999 to launch a Stability Pact in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis reflects an integrated, comprehensive and coherent approach to the entire region.¹¹ The concept of the Stability Pact was (a) to isolate and limit the Kosovo crisis, and (b) to develop a political framework for promoting stability in South-eastern Europe in a more co-ordinated way. The concept is innovative, although in its essence it is reminiscent of the Marshall Plan offered to post-war Europe by the United States in 1947. In the long term, the Stability Pact offers those countries in the region which seek integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures a prospect of achieving this goal, especially in the context of their aspirations to join the EU.

9 The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, para. 16, at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm>.

10 Cf. Annual Report 1999, cited above (Note 8).

11 The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Cologne, 10 June 1999, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (Ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1999, Baden-Baden 2000, pp. 551-564.

The decision-making bodies of the Stability Pact consist of a system of three Working Tables addressing issues similar to the "baskets" of the Helsinki process established 25 years before: (a) democratization and the promotion of civil societies; (b) economic development; and (c) internal and external security. The results of the Working Tables are brought together at the South Eastern Europe Regional Table. The members are the states which are participants in the Stability Pact and - by invitation - other institutions such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and financial institutions. A novelty of the Stability Pact process is that all the members of the Working Tables enjoy full equality. The Pact did not create any new organization or structure but made it possible for all interested states and international organizations to collaborate under OSCE auspices. Some progress could already be observed in the work of all Working Groups by the end of 1999.¹²

The Sarajevo Summit Declaration of Heads of State and Government, issued on 30 July, confirmed the commitments undertaken under the Stability Pact. Two aspects of the process initiated in Cologne and endorsed in Sarajevo are central: (a) promoting political and economic reforms, development and enhanced security; and (b) facilitating the integration of South-eastern European countries into Euro-Atlantic structures. The Sarajevo Declaration contained a message addressed to the people of the FRY "to embrace democratic change and work actively for regional reconciliation". With this intention, the participants at the Sarajevo Summit decided to "consider ways of making the Republic of Montenegro an early beneficiary of the pact" and reaffirmed their support of all democratic forces.¹³

The philosophy reflected in both the Stability Pact and the Sarajevo Declaration is to engage the countries of the region in security co-operation and in the democratic transformation and reconstruction of South-eastern Europe. They bear the main responsibility for its stabilization and their actions are of critical importance. The other state signatories of both documents undertook to support these actions in order "to accelerate the transition in the region to stable democracies, prosperous market economies and open and pluralistic societies in which human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, are respected, as an important step in their integration into euro-atlantic and global institutions".¹⁴

12 Cf. Bodo Hombach, *The Stability Pact: Breaking new ground in the Balkans*, in: *NATO Review* 4/1999, pp. 20-23, here: p. 22. Hombach reported that on the defence side progress had been made on such matters as improved military-to-military contacts similar to confidence-building measures, control of arms sales, reducing the transfer of small arms, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

13 Sarajevo Summit Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the participating and facilitating countries of the Stability Pact and the Principals of participating and facilitating International Organizations and Agencies and regional initiatives, Sarajevo, 30 July 1999, at: www.stabilitypact.org/Official%20Texts/SUMMIT.HTM. or at: www.Summit-sarajevo-99.ba/commun.htm, para. 4

14 *Ibid.*, para. 7.

The main challenge for all European security institutions is to build multi-ethnic societies on the basis of substantial autonomy in Kosovo and other countries of the region while still respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of existing states, including the FRY. The decisions taken in 1999 by NATO, the EU and the OSCE demonstrated the need for a broader view of the region: Regional co-operation should be a catalyst for the integration of the South-eastern European countries into broader structures. The Istanbul Summit Declaration states that the OSCE "has a key role to play in contributing to (the Stability Pact's) success".¹⁵ In fact, the problems that face the signatories of the documents adopted in Cologne and Sarajevo - ensuring democratic development, political pluralism and respect for the rights of individuals and minorities within states as well as the integrity of those states - relate to almost all conflict situations. They are the very problems the OSCE was set up to deal with and, although often associated with developments in the area of former Yugoslavia, they are also the main cause of instability in former Soviet space.

The Istanbul Summit Meeting

The Istanbul Summit Declaration reaffirmed several essential elements that make up a new type of security system in Europe. First, except for the dispute, which has lasted for over ten years between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, all the conflicts the OSCE has dealt with are essentially of a domestic character. Even so, none of the states concerned, including Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova and Ukraine, have questioned the legitimacy or role of the OSCE in seeking peaceful solutions. Nor has Russia questioned the right of international organizations to do this or the mandate of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya, which is to assist in the renewal of a political dialogue and initiate the process of finding a lasting, comprehensive solution to the problem there. The second element is the commitment to apply the acknowledged principles and norms, including respect for human rights and the rights of minorities, condemnation and rejection of "ethnic cleansing", and support for the unconditional and safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons. The third element, which is of key importance for ensuring stability in the OSCE area, is overall support for a policy of tolerance and for a multi-ethnic society "where the rights of all citizens and the rule of law are respected"¹⁶ but no intention of undermining or calling into question the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states to whom decisions of the international community are addressed.

15 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Istanbul Summit Declaration, Istanbul, November 1999, reprinted in this volume, pp. 413-424, here: p. 416.

16 Sarajevo Summit Declaration, cited above (Note 13), para. 4.

At the Meeting in Istanbul participants were faced with the question of Russia's use of force on a mass scale in Chechnya. The use of violence and terror against the civilian population as a whole and recourse to the rule of "collective responsibility" - holding the population at large answerable for the crimes of the few, as has been seen in Chechnya - cannot be equated with combating terrorism. Russia's reaction to the criticism of the international community in the period up to the Istanbul Summit Meeting came close to jeopardizing the successful conclusion of the Meeting.¹⁷ However the Meeting was in fact not ended prematurely and several important documents were adopted. Nevertheless, the price for this "moderate success" was the application of a double standard: The OSCE in practice made greater demands on the small and medium-sized states and was more lenient towards the major powers, especially Russia, regarding violations of their international commitments.¹⁸ The result was a serious erosion of OSCE's authority and demonstrated that there were limits in enforcing its principles.

In the confrontation between principles and practice, the latter won. Since OSCE decisions are based on consensus, the documents adopted reflect a balance of interests. In effect, a political compromise made it possible to agree on several essential new steps, which are to facilitate the implementation of OSCE principles and norms and make its decisions aimed at preventing the outbreak of violent conflict wherever possible more effective.

The Charter for European Security, signed at Istanbul on 19 November 1999 by 54 OSCE Heads of States or Government (excluding the FRY), reflects the experience and the crises of recent years and adapts OSCE principles and norms to the new requirements.

The decision to prepare a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st century was taken at the Budapest Summit Meeting of the OSCE in December 1994.¹⁹ It stemmed from the twin needs (a) to give expression to fundamental changes and define new risks and challenges, as well as (b) to develop new instruments which would not only be expedients but also part of a broader system and mechanism of conflict prevention.²⁰ Over more than five years of negotiations since then, hundreds of proposals have been made which reflect differing visions of a European security system and

17 "The conflict in Chechnya shows OSCE limitations clearly. In times of serious crises, it is too weak to be able to enforce its principles." *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 19 November 1999, p. 4 (author's translation).

18 "The OSCE is an organization with great ambitions but little power to act." *La Stampa*, 20 November 1999 (author's translation). "The OSCE Meeting in Istanbul will go down in history as 'the Chechnya Meeting' (...) Russia was at the centre of attention - Russia with the bleeding issue of Chechnya." *Izvestiya*, 20 November 1999 (author's translation). See also *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 November 1999.

19 Cf. Budapest Document 1994, Budapest, 6 December 1994, in: Arie Bloed (Ed.), *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Basic Documents, 1993-1995*, The Hague/London/Boston 1997, pp. 145-189, here: p. 173.

20 "To find comprehensive solutions and not just 'quick fixes', we must look beyond these immediate needs", stated Wilhelm Höynck, OSCE Secretary General. See also Rotfeld, cited above (Note 1), p. 303.

different concepts of the OSCE's role in such a system. Russia demanded a hierarchical and normative order, which would reaffirm legal and international treaty commitments. The EU states, differences among them notwithstanding, were inclined towards more pragmatic solutions.²¹

The main new elements in the Charter are new steps, means and mechanisms to enhance the role of the OSCE as a key instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation; it does not seek yet again to determine new or reinterpret old principles.

Agreement was reached on six new types of activity: (a) a Platform for Co-operative Security, the aim of which is to strengthen co-operation between the OSCE and other international organizations and institutions and thus make better use of the resources of the international community; (b) the development of the OSCE's role in peacekeeping operations; (c) the creation of Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) to enable the OSCE to respond quickly to requests for assistance, to offer civilian and police expertise in conflict situations, to deploy the civilian component of peacekeeping operations quickly and to address problems before they become crises; (d) the expansion of the OSCE's ability to do police-related work, including police monitoring, training and assistance in maintaining the primacy of law; (e) the establishment of an Operation Centre at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna to facilitate preparation, planning and rapid deployment of OSCE field operations; and (f) the establishment of a Preparatory Committee under the OSCE Permanent Council to strengthen the consultation process.²²

The Charter is designed much more for operational tasks than was originally assumed or expected. It reaffirms the states' responsibility to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including "the rights of persons belonging to national minorities".²³ This is not an innovative provision: Commitments of this kind were contained in numerous documents and conventions adopted within the UN system, in the Council of Europe, in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and in the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. A new provision, however, is that international security and peace must be enhanced through a dual approach: "(W)e must build confidence among people within States and strengthen co-operation between States."²⁴

Also new are the instruments and mechanisms that are to assist and strengthen state bodies in activities that would traditionally be seen as falling within the competence and discretionary power of the individual state. In their security policies, states should be guided by "equal partnership, solidarity and transparency".

21 On the main opening positions cf. *ibid.*, pp. 303-06.

22 Cf. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter for European Security, Istanbul, November 1999, published in this volume pp. 425-443, here: p. 426.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 427.

24 *Ibid.*

An essential element of the Charter for European Security is an elaborate OSCE code of conduct regulating its co-operation with other organizations.²⁵ It recognizes the integrating role that the OSCE can play, without creating a hierarchy of organizations or a permanent division of labour among them. The Platform for Co-operative Security, adopted within the Charter, can be considered a new stage in the development of the concept reflected in the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security contained in the 1994 Budapest Document.²⁶ The Charter states:

"The risks and challenges we face today cannot be met by a single State or organization (...) In order to make full use of the resources of the international community, we are committed to even closer co-operation among international organizations (...) Through this Platform (for Co-operative Security) we seek to develop and maintain political and operational coherence, on the basis of shared values, among all the various bodies dealing with security, both in responding to specific crises and in formulating responses to new risks and challenges. Recognizing the key integrating role that the OSCE can play, we offer the OSCE, when appropriate, as a flexible co-ordinating framework to foster co-operation, through which various organizations can reinforce each other drawing on their particular strengths. We do not intend to create a hierarchy of organizations or a permanent division of labour among them.

We are ready in principle to deploy the resources of international organizations and institutions of which we are members in support of the OSCE's work, subject to the necessary policy decisions as cases arise.

(...) Subregional co-operation has become an important element in enhancing security across the OSCE area. Processes such as the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, which has been placed under the auspices of the OSCE, help to promote our common values. They contribute to improved security not just in the subregion in question but throughout the OSCE area. We offer the OSCE, in accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security, as a forum for subregional co-operation. In this respect, and in accordance with the modalities in the operational document, the OSCE will facilitate the exchange of information and experience between subregional groups and may, if so requested, receive and keep their mutual accords and agreements."²⁷

Two follow-up conferences, in 1997 and 1999, confirmed states' adherence to the 1994 Code of Conduct and the principle of democratic control of armed forces which it emphasized. A suggestion was raised at the OSCE Review Conference in June 1999 that the issue of corruption in defence spending should be addressed. To promote transparency, it was suggested that information exchanges based on national responses to the questionnaire on im-

25 This code of conduct is reflected in the Platform for Co-operative Security set out as an "operational document" attached to the Charter for European Security. It defines the rules, commitments and modalities of co-operation. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 441-443.

26 Budapest Document, cited above (Note 19), pp. 145-189.

27 Charter for European Security, cited above (Note 22), pp. 429-430.

plementation of OSCE States' commitments could be made public on an Internet site.²⁸ The Charter for European Security reaffirmed the validity of the Code of Conduct and declared that the signatory states would consult promptly "with a participating State seeking assistance in realizing its right to individual or collective defence in the event that its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence are threatened".²⁹ In other words, the Charter reflects a new political commitment to consider jointly the nature of threats and actions that may be required in defence of common values.

The Charter for European Security should be evaluated in the context of the general political situation and in particular the Russian military action in Chechnya. This accounts for the fact that this document has a more operational character rather than being a code of principles and norms guiding the relations between the OSCE participating States.

The OSCE and the New Security Architecture

Today, the essence of security is rightly seen not exactly through the prism of businesslike contacts on secondary issues, but in the search for an answer to the questions: What is the architecture of future security in Europe to be like? Which organizations are to play the key role, NATO and the EU or the OSCE? It is not a secret that in the debate on a model for future European security, a concept has been proposed giving the OSCE the character and status of the most important security structure. A question arises whether this kind of a hierarchical approach is required.

Another issue is whether one of - and if so which one of - the existing organizations in Europe might play the key role in the new security system.

The views expressed in the report entitled "Russia in the System of International Relations in the Coming Decade", prepared five years ago by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), one of the most authoritative research centres of the Russian Academy of Sciences, reflect much better the real understanding of the present and future role of the OSCE, as seen from the Russian perspective, than many official statements and declarations:

"Looking into the nearest future, it is very difficult to imagine a situation in which the OSCE would genuinely provide the main pillar of European stability. Balance and universalism of this inter-state structure, which are necessary for lowering the tensions of inter-bloc antagonism, are proving insuffi-

28 For more detail, see Review of the Implementation of all OSCE Principles and Commitments, OSCE Review Conference, RC(99).JOUR/10, Vienna, 1 October 1999. Several proposals have been made with the aim of ensuring proper implementation and further development of the Code of Conduct. See also Reports of the Second Follow-up Conference on the Code of Conduct, FSC.DEL/221/99, 30 June 1999, FSC.DEL/235/99 and FSC.DEL/236/99, 1 July 1999; and Chairman's report, FSC./DEL/252/99, 7 July 1999 and FSC/GAL/84/99/Rev. 1, 19 July 1999.

29 Charter for European Security, cited above (note 22), p. 430.

cient in the new circumstances even for settling an individual conflict, let alone ensuring security and stability on the pan-European scale. The capacities of the OSCE at present and for the foreseeable future are quite rigidly limited, on both the institutional and operational levels. It is and will not be able to provide a considerable military-political force. The 'common denominator' of security interests and stability is insufficient to meet the specific interests of participating States in the sphere of foreign policy and to form among them a leading body which would operate in accordance with a future OSCE Statute, a legally binding document."³⁰

Developments in the past five years have confirmed that the authors' reasoning strikes a note of realism.

The same authors affirmed that "NATO will survive in the foreseeable future, all changes notwithstanding, through internal transformation and adaptation to the changing circumstances. However, the very fact of retaining the immense concentration of the bloc's military potential will not pose a danger to Russia's security, because its main direction is (set) at maintaining the stability in Europe and out of its area. Considering that even in the period of confrontation NATO did not have an offensive potential at its disposal, all the more it is characteristic for the present and future conditions."³¹ The authors of the study, like many others, expressed concern about a reconstruction of the security system in Europe which, on the one hand, would lead to NATO's expansion, and, on the other, could do harm to the national interests of Russia. Nevertheless, they reject arguments about a threat to Russia posed by "NATO aggressiveness". What is more, they found the Alliance "the main factor of stability on the continent". Although this state of affairs is not always compatible with Russian interests, one should, in the opinion of the IMEMO authors, consider the "Westernization" of Central and Eastern Europe, following that of Southern and Northern Europe, "an objective, historically warranted process".³² Russia faces two alternatives: either co-operation with all of Europe in all fields including the security and arms control sphere or a return to confrontation and a policy of enmity towards the West.

Conclusions

Ten years after the end of the Cold War, the realities that determine the transatlantic agenda have changed completely. The decisions adopted by and arrangements made within NATO, the EU and the OSCE have taken these

30 Rossiya v sisteme mezhdunarodnikh otnoshenii blizhaishego desatiletiya [Russia in the System of International Relations in the Next Decade] (Report on the results of prognostication research done within the research project financed by the Russian Fund for Basic Research), IMEMO, Moscow 1995 (author's translation).

31 Ibid., pp. 40-41.

32 "One can flexibly adapt (to this process, ADR) by limiting damage and taking advantage of it or embark upon the road of dumb opposition and, consequently, increase damage and squander benefits." Ibid., p. 48 (author's translation).

changes into account and set out a new conceptual framework for the further shaping of the security system in Europe. These three security-related structures are adapting internally; NATO and the EU have initiated the process of Eastward enlargement. The OSCE Charter for European Security codified a set of arrangements for closer co-operation between all security-related international institutions existing in Europe. The NATO intervention in Kosovo and the bloody conflict in Chechnya in 1999 were the litmus test of the effectiveness and, at the same time, of the limitations which these multilateral security institutions have encountered in their attempts to prevent and resolve conflicts.

NATO, EU and OSCE documents are the expression of the new role played by multinational security organizations and reflect the process of redefining national interests. The decisions regarding security adopted in 1999 give expression to the concept that political and operational coherence is possible if it is based on common values and close co-operation between all the bodies dealing with transatlantic security.