

Ten Years of the Conflict Prevention Centre - Origins and Development

Preface

On 18 March 1991, the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) of the then CSCE was officially inaugurated in Vienna. Its establishment had manifold, although mostly ignored, consequences for the further development of the then CSCE into today's OSCE, as well as the emergence of the OSCE's main hub in Vienna. The tasks and functions of the CPC, too, were subject to waves of changes and developments during the ten years of its existence. They were caused, on the one hand, by a changing environment as well as the structural development of the CSCE/OSCE institutions, but also, on the other, by coincidental or *ad hoc* decisions.

The following outline attempts to present this development in its different steps and phases, seen through the perspective of a person actively involved throughout the first phase. It seems all the more relevant because in particular with respect to the first phases, the development will not be properly understood if only official sources, for example the respective CSCE/OSCE decisions, are referred to, which in many cases are only belated *de jure* confirmations of developments that had already taken place.

The Roots

The roots for the very idea of a conflict prevention centre can be found in several proposals made at the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (NCSBMs) which had been mandated by the Vienna Follow-up Meeting to the CSCE (1986-1989), and which were held in parallel to the Negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). According to the Vienna mandate, "Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures will take place in order to build upon and expand the results already achieved at the Stockholm Conference¹ with the aim of elaborating and adopting a new set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in

1 The Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) took place from 1984-1986. It had received its mandate at the Madrid Follow-up Meeting (1980-1983) and resulted in the adoption of the Stockholm Document.

Europe. These negotiations will take place in accordance with the Madrid mandate."²

Negotiations were opened in Vienna on 6 March 1989 and were to lead to another document by the next follow-up meeting, already planned to take place in Helsinki in 1992. In the course of the negotiations, not only were significant improvements of already existing measures proposed, but also innovative measures concerning improved communication as well as consultation mechanisms were suggested.

The creation of mechanisms and pertinent institutions followed several tracks. The first Western proposal during the NCSBMs³ contained as measure 11 the "development of means of communication" in addition to the existing diplomatic channels. This idea was elaborated in more detail in the proposal of 9 June 1989⁴ demanding that each participating State should designate a point of contact capable of receiving such information, preferably on a 24-hour basis.

Parallel to the first Western proposal, the then WTO countries, Bulgaria, GDR, CSSR and Hungary on 9 March 1989 tabled a proposal⁵ containing the "development of a special communications system for the mutual clarification of situations giving rise to doubts or apprehensions on any side".⁶ Furthermore, the proposal incorporated the "holding on a regular basis of bilateral and multilateral consultations"⁷ as well as the explicit idea of the "establishment of a centre for the reduction of the risk of war and prevention of surprise attack in Europe which should have an informational and consultative character".⁸ The idea of a communications system was also supported in the Romanian proposal⁹ and by the group of neutral and non-aligned (N+N) states in their proposal of 12 July 1989.¹⁰ Thus already at this stage, all relevant groups within the CSCE had included the idea of a communications system in their proposals. Furthermore, some had already suggested several consultation mechanisms, and proposed creating specific institutions to deal with war/crisis prevention.

A few months later, the changes in Central and Eastern Europe took place which had a direct impact on the negotiations as well. First, they stimulated their progress in substance. Second, however, they also created the conditions for establishing the first then CSCE institutions, including the CPC.

2 Concluding Document of Vienna, Vienna, 15 January 1989, in: Arie Bloed (Ed.), *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993*, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1993, pp. 327-411, here: p. 341.

3 CSCE/WV1, 9 March 1989.

4 CSCE/WV1 amplified, 9 June 1989.

5 CSCE/WV2, 9 March 1989. The proposal was tabled before the democratic changes took place and thus still reflected the "old thinking" of the then Warsaw Treaty Organization.

6 *Ibid.*, point V/8.

7 *Ibid.*, point V/5.

8 *Ibid.*, point V/7.

9 CSCE/WV3, 22 March 1989, point 5.

10 CSCE/WV5, 12 July 1989.

During the following stages, the proposals for a communications system and for consultation mechanisms took shape. In its proposal of 18 May 1990¹¹, the Western group suggested several options for a communications network (measure 11), as well as an elaborated "mechanism for discussion of unusual activities of a military nature" (measure 15) and "measures reducing the risk of and reporting hazardous incidents" (measure 16). Another part of the same provision envisaged the establishment of points of contact for hazardous incidents of a military nature.

These ideas were then included in the comprehensive French proposal of 8 June 1990¹² for a concluding document, and without major changes found their way into the Vienna Document 1990. Its measure IX (Communications) envisages the establishment of a network of direct communications between the capitals of all participating States for the transmission of messages relating to agreed measures, complementing the existing diplomatic channels. Measure II (Risk Reduction) contains, first of all, the mechanism for consultation and co-operation as regards unusual military activities.

The measure builds on the existence of a Conflict Prevention Centre.¹³ The CPC's existence was also made a necessary condition for the second mechanism in the area of military risk reduction, i.e. co-operation as regards hazardous incidents of a military nature (measure II).¹⁴

The negotiations on and the adoption of emergency mechanisms within the military CSBMs can thus be seen as the roots leading to the creation of the Conflict Prevention Centre in its original sense in the close context of the concepts of a communication network¹⁵ and of consultation mechanisms. The pertinent provisions of the Vienna Document define the CPC as a forum for consultations on unusual military activities or on hazardous incidents. These characteristics, in turn, reach back to the ideas of a "centre for the reduction of dangers of war", contained in the very first proposal of the then Eastern group.

11 CSCE/WV8, 18 May 1990.

12 CSCE/WV12, 8 June 1990.

13 Bilateral meetings were to be held at a venue mutually agreed upon by the requesting and the responding States or, if no agreement could be achieved, at the Conflict Prevention Centre (para. 17.2.1.4). In the case of a meeting of all participating States, the Conflict Prevention Centre will serve as the forum for such a meeting (para. 17.2.2.2). Cf. Vienna Document 1990, Vienna, 17 November 1990, in: Bloed, cited above (Note 2), pp. 489-532, here: p. 495.

14 Participating States will co-operate by reporting and clarifying hazardous incidents of a military nature within the zone of application for CSBMs in order to prevent possible misunderstandings and mitigate the effects on another participating State (para. 18). Each participating State will designate a point to contact in case of such hazardous incidents and will so inform all other participating States. A list of such points will be kept available at the Conflict Prevention Centre (para. 18.1), the CPC would also serve as a forum to discuss such incidents (para 18.4). Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 495-496.

15 This concept may be traced back to the establishment of the "hot line" between the US and the USSR as a consequence of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and the subsequent establishment of similar communication lines between Moscow, Paris and London. It thus represents a multilateral application of a practice previously established on a bilateral basis.

The creation of the CPC as such was, however, not reflected in the Vienna Document itself but took place within the wider framework of establishing the first CSCE institutions. Parallel to the NCSBMs, and in response to a pertinent invitation by France, the then CSCE participating States prepared for the Paris Summit scheduled for November 1990, which was to codify the basis for a new and democratic Europe. In a first step, NATO member states modified their previously sceptical position vis-à-vis establishing permanent institutions within the CSCE. At NATO's annual summit on 5-6 July 1990 they adopted a decision¹⁶ suggesting the establishment of a CSCE body to meet annually, a permanent CSCE Secretariat, a CSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, and a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly. To prepare for the Paris Summit, a Committee was established in Vienna parallel to the NCSBMs with its first meeting on 10 July 1990. It elaborated the decisions which were finally adopted by the participating States as the Charter of Paris in November 1990.¹⁷

Origins and Original Structure of the CPC

The CPC was established, together with other then CSCE institutions, at the Paris Summit. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe and its Supplementary Document for the first time created permanent structures (bodies and institutions) in the then CSCE framework.¹⁸ The CSCE was to have scheduled rather than unstructured follow-up meetings. Furthermore, bodies meeting regularly were created (a Council of the participating States' Foreign Ministers, and a Committee of Senior Officials/CSO). In addition, the following permanent institutions were created:

16 London Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5th-6th 1990, in: NATO's Sixteen Nations 4/1990, pp. 66-68. Para. 22 recommended for the Paris Summit that the CSCE governments should establish

- "(...) regular consultations among member governments at the Heads of State and Government or Ministerial level, at least once each year, with other periodic meetings of officials to prepare for and follow up on these consultations;
- a schedule of CSCE review conferences once every two years to assess progress toward a Europe whole and free;
- a small CSCE secretariat to coordinate these meetings and conferences;
- a CSCE mechanism to monitor elections in all the CSCE countries, on the basis of the Copenhagen Document;
- a CSCE Centre for the Prevention of Conflict that might serve as a forum for exchanges of military information, discussion of unusual military activities, and the conciliation of disputes involving CSCE member states; and
- a CSCE parliamentary body, the Assembly of Europe, to be based on the existing parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, in Strasbourg, and include representatives of all CSCE member states".

It should be noted that the declaration implicitly anticipates the transformation of the CSCE into a full-fledged international organization by using the term "member state" rather than the term "participating State" as established within the CSCE.

17 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 21 November 1990, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 2), pp. 537-566.

18 Cf. Chapter on New Structures and Institutions of the CSCE Process, *ibid.*, pp. 548-550.

- a CSCE Secretariat in Prague to provide support for consultations by the Council and the CSO;¹⁹
- an Office for Free Elections (OFE) in Warsaw to facilitate contacts and the exchange of information on elections within participating States;²⁰
- a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna to assist the Council in reducing the risk of conflicts.²¹

The procedural and organizational modalities for some of the Charter's provisions were elaborated in more detail in the Charter's Supplementary Document which was adopted along with the Charter. It also regulated the tasks and structures of the three institutions.

The institutions differed, however, both in their functions and in their basic structures. Both the CSCE Secretariat and the OFE were designed as purely administrative units to execute decisions taken by one of the bodies mentioned (Council or CSO). Their structures consisted accordingly of

- a Director, responsible to the Council through the CSO;
- one or more officers seconded by the participating States;
- administrative and technical personnel, recruited by the Director.²²

In contrast, the CPC had wider tasks and thus also a different structure. According to the Supplementary Document to the Paris Charter, during its initial stage of operations the CPC's role would consist in giving support to the implementation of CSBMs such as:

- mechanism for consultation and co-operation as regards unusual military activities;
- annual exchange of military information;
- communications network;
- annual implementation assessment meetings;
- co-operation as regards hazardous incidents of a military nature.²³

However, the Supplementary Document further pointed out that the Centre might assume other functions and the above tasks were without any prejudice to any additional tasks concerning a procedure for the conciliation of disputes as

19 "(...) to provide administrative support for these consultations" (namely by the above mentioned bodies, the Council and the CSO), *ibid.*, p. 549

20 Cf. *ibid.*; the Office was later renamed as the "Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights" (ODIHR).

21 Cf. *ibid.*

22 Cf. Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions Contained in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, *ibid.*, pp. 551-559, here: pp. 553 and 555, Chapters F, para. 3, and G, para. 5.

23 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 553, chapter F, para. 2.

well as broader tasks relating to dispute settlement, which might be assigned to it in the future by the Council of the Foreign Ministers.²⁴

In accordance with the functions attributed to the CPC by the Vienna Document, it had a two-layered structure, consisting of:

- a decision-making body, the Consultative Committee (CC) which until the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting was, as a rule, to be composed of the delegations to the CSBM negotiations in Vienna, and was responsible to the Council only, being a body of all participating States, and
- a Secretariat, consisting of
 - a Director;
 - two officers seconded by participating States, and
 - administrative and technical personnel, recruited by the Director.²⁵

The CPC thus had a special status within the then structure of the CSCE institutions, being the only permanent institution with a decision-making body of its own. It was thus not responsible to the CSO but only to the Council.

The Consultative Committee was the core of the CPC in its proper sense, resulting from its main function as the consultation forum foreseen in the Vienna Document's provisions on the military emergency mechanisms. The Paris Charter assigned the CC the following functions:

- holding the meetings of participating States which may be convened under the mechanism on unusual military activities;
- holding annual implementation assessment meetings;
- preparing seminars on military doctrine and such other seminars as would be agreed by the participating States;
- supervising the Secretariat of the Centre;
- providing the forum for discussion and clarification, as necessary, of information exchanged under agreed CSBMs;
- having overall responsibility for the communications network within the mandate of the CPC.²⁶

The Secretariat of the CPC - the only really permanent structure within the CPC - was to carry out the tasks assigned to it by the Consultative Committee to which it was responsible. In particular, it was to establish and maintain a data bank, for the use of all participating States, compiled on the basis of exchanged military information under agreed CSBMs and to publish yearbooks on that ba-

24 Cf. *ibid.*, chapter F, para. 3. The Berlin Council Meeting (19-20 June 1991) designated the CPC as the nominating institution regarding the mechanism on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes; see below.

25 Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 553-554, chapter F, paras. 4 and 7.

26 Cf. *ibid.*, chapter F, para. 4.

sis.²⁷ In addition, the Director was responsible for the organization of meetings convened under the mechanism for consultation and co-operation as regards unusual military activities.

The pertinent provisions had also thus established a clear division of labour with respect to emergency meetings. The Secretariat was responsible for "mobilization"²⁸ with regard to the meetings of the CC. The CC, in turn, had to make substantive decisions.

The CPC's original function as a consultation forum was activated on two occasions during the Yugoslav crisis.²⁹ The first case, triggered by Austria, concerned multilateral consultations of the CC on 1 July 1991 on military activities during the conflict in Slovenia.³⁰ The second case involved bilateral consultations between Yugoslavia and Hungary on 1 September 1991 and incorporated the CPC Secretariat in supporting the consultations.³¹ In both cases, consultations applied to the violation of the requesting states' airspace by the Yugoslav air force. Thus the consultations did not deal primarily with the decrease in the scope of the violence within (then) Yugoslavia, but to the de-escalation at the borders with neighbouring states, and therefore served their primary purpose.

Further Developments

The further developments of the CPC took place within the overall framework of the CSCE's conversion into the OSCE.

The Berlin Council Meeting (19-20 June 1991) adopted, *inter alia*, the CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, which had been worked out at an expert meeting in La Valletta in January/February 1991,³² and designated the CPC "to act as the nominating institution in accordance with Section V of the

27 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 554, chapter F, para 6. Such yearbooks could not be compiled and published as delegations to the CC were first unable to agree on the substance and modalities of these yearbooks, and because the CPC's tasks during the further development of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia shifted to other functions, primarily mission support.

28 This was also related, *inter alia*, to the technical preparation of meetings. As permanent conference services were established only by the Helsinki Decisions in 1992, the CPC during that period had to rely on the conference services of the then ongoing negotiations which were not always available. It also required 24-hour availability of the Secretariat. As the low number of personnel at that time (one Director, two seconded officers, and four locally recruited personnel) would not have allowed for a permanent presence in the office, availability was maintained by a mobile telephone kept by the respective duty officer - a rather innovative approach for an international institution at that time.

29 A third case concerned a request by Yugoslavia in April 1992 for an explanation of military activities in a neighbouring state, but did not lead to further consultations.

30 For details see: Heinz Vetschera, Die KSZE-Krisenmechanismen und ihr Einsatz in der Jugoslawien-Krise [The CSCE Crisis Mechanisms and Their Employment in the Yugoslavia Crisis]; in: *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ)* 5/1991, pp. 405-411.

31 The author represented the CPC at this meeting.

32 Cf. Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Valletta, 8 February 1991, in: Bloed (Ed.) cited above (Note 2), pp. 567-581. It contains the Principles for Dispute Settlement and Provisions for a CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. The procedure was subsequently amended and simplified at the Stockholm Council Meeting in late 1992.

(...) Provisions (of the Report of the Valletta 1991 Meeting. H.V.)³³, i.e. to keep the register of qualified candidates to be nominated by the participating States for a third-party function in dispute settlement.

The Prague Council Meeting (30-31 January 1992) adopted several guidelines for the upcoming Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, including, *inter alia*, strengthening the capacity of the CSCE to contribute to a peaceful solution of problems involving national minorities including possibilities for early warning; further development of the CSCE's capability for conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes.³⁴

Within the CPC, the Consultative Committee was given the task of serving as a forum for "comprehensive and regular" consultations on security issues with politico-military implications as well as a forum for consultation and co-operation in conflict prevention and for co-operation in the implementation of decisions on crisis management taken by the Council or the CSO acting as its agent. It was also given authority to initiate, and with the assistance of the CPC Secretariat to execute fact-finding and monitoring missions in connection with the mechanism as regards unusual military activities. The CPC would, in addition to its existing support to the implementation of CSBMs, also fulfil other functions regarding the implementation and verification of agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control.³⁵

The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting 1992 was the pivotal point in the development of the CSCE into the OSCE. On the one hand, it was still mandated by the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986.³⁶ On the other hand, it constituted the first Summit Meeting as foreseen by the Paris Charter. It was at this Meeting that the Helsinki Decisions were adopted which also had a major impact on the further development of the CPC.

The Helsinki Decisions created the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC),³⁷ with a strengthened Conflict Prevention Centre, as an integral part of the CSCE.³⁸ The Forum replaced the previous Negotiations on CSBMs which had been mandated by the Vienna Follow-up Meeting and were to be assessed by the next follow-up Meeting in Helsinki.³⁹ The Helsinki Meeting followed,

33 Berlin Meeting of the CSCE Council, 19-20 June 1991, Summary of Conclusions, Annex 3, para. 1, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 2), pp. 807-818, here: p. 814.

34 Cf. Prague Meeting of the CSCE Council, 30-31 January 1992, in: Bloed (Ed.), pp. 821-839, Summary of Conclusions, pp. 821-829, here: p. 822, chapter III, para. 6.

35 Cf. Prague Meeting of the CSCE Council, cited above (Note 34), Prague Document on further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures, pp. 830-838, here: pp. 834-835, chapter VI, paras. 27, 28, 29, 32. The provision on its functions regarding the implementation and verification of agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control refers implicitly to the CFE Treaty but under the caveat that these functions might be exerted only "if so requested by the parties to those agreements and agreed upon by the Consultative Committee", *ibid.*, para. 32.

36 Cf. Concluding Document of Vienna, cited above (Note 2), pp. 369-370.

37 Cf. CSCE Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 2), pp. 701-777, chapter V, pp. 733-743.

38 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 734, chapter V, para. 9.

39 Cf. Concluding Document of Vienna, cited above (Note 2), p. 341. The Helsinki Meeting in this traditional view would also have had the task of elaborating the mandate for a further

however, the new trend towards creating permanent institutions and established, for the first time, a permanent body of all participating States,⁴⁰ albeit only within one of the then CSCE's three dimensions.

In accordance with its tasks, the Forum was to meet on the one hand as the "Special Committee", on negotiations on arms control, disarmament and confidence and security building, and on the other as the Consultative Committee in respect of the existing and future tasks of the CPC.⁴¹ In addition, it served as a *de facto* framework for informal consultations among delegations to prepare the CSO Meetings in Prague. This fact fed directly into concentrating the Organization's work in Vienna, which became ratified by subsequent decisions.

In order to ensure coherence the representation of the participating States on the Special Committee and the Consultative Committee were in principle assured by the same delegation.⁴² While the Consultative Committee thus became integrated into the FSC's permanent structures, the CPC Secretariat for the time being remained an institution in its own right, subordinated only to the Consultative Committee.

Finally, the Helsinki Decisions also established Conference Services as a permanent institution.⁴³ They replaced the Conference Secretariats which until then had been organized only within the limited scope of a concrete conference.

Chapter III of the Helsinki Decisions on "Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management (including Fact-finding and Rapporteur Missions and CSCE Peacekeeping), Peaceful Settlement of Disputes"⁴⁴ gave primary responsibility to the CSO but also envisaged several functions for the CPC, with an emphasis, however, on the Consultative Committee. It was given the right to draw the attention of the CSO to situations within the CSCE area which had the potential to develop into crises, including armed conflicts.⁴⁵ With regard to the

round of negotiations, in analogy to the previous pattern where the Madrid Meeting had given the mandate for the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in 1983, and progress had to be reported to the Vienna Follow-up Meeting, which in turn gave the mandate for a next round of negotiations. It appears that there were still similar ideas at the time of the Prague Council Meeting, which envisaged "the establishment, by 1992, from the conclusion of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, of *new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building* open to all participating States (...)", Prague Meeting of the CSCE Council, Summary of Conclusions, cited above (Note 34), p. 825, chapter VII, para. 12 (emphasis H.V.).

40 The bodies established by the Paris Charter (Council, Committee of Senior Officials, Consultative Committee) were based on *regular* meetings but did not yet constitute *permanent* institutions. Thus, between the Paris Summit and the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, the NCSBMs in Vienna were the only CSCE body with a truly permanent representation of all participating States.

41 Cf. CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, cited above (Note 37), p. 737, chapter V, paras. 30 and 31. The wording is, however, somewhat unclear as it could also be interpreted to mean that the CC could be a body *outside* the Forum. The previous provisions, however, would indicate that the CC represents a specific manifestation of the Forum.

42 Cf. *ibid.*, chapter V, para. 32.

43 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 739, chapter V, para. 43.

44 Title of chapter III, *ibid.*, pp. 722-730.

45 The same warning could be undertaken by a state directly involved in a dispute, by a group of eleven states not directly involved, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, or by the

instruments of conflict prevention and crisis management, the Helsinki Decisions foresee, first, that *the CSO or the CC* may decide by consensus to establish fact-finding and rapporteur missions "(w)ithout prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 13 of the Moscow Document in respect of Human Dimension issues, and paragraph 29 of the Prague Document in respect of Unusual Military Activities".⁴⁶

Further functions for the CPC were foreseen in the context of CSCE peacekeeping, the framework for which was also established by the Helsinki Decisions. CSCE peacekeeping activities could be undertaken "in cases of conflict within or among participating States". The purpose of peacekeeping activities were, *inter alia*, to "supervise and help maintain cease-fires, to monitor troop withdrawals, to support the maintenance of law and order, to provide humanitarian and medical aid and to assist refugees".⁴⁷

Decisions to initiate and dispatch peacekeeping operations would be taken by consensus by the Council or the CSO, which would have "overall political control and guidance"⁴⁸ of a peacekeeping operation, but foresee also some role for the CPC.⁴⁹ For example, the CSO could request the CC to consider which peacekeeping activities might be most appropriate to the situation and to submit its recommendations to the CSO for decision.⁵⁰ Overall operational guidance of an operation would rest with the Chairman-in-Office, who would be assisted by an *ad hoc* group established at the CPC.⁵¹ The group would provide operational support for the mission and act as a 24-hour point of contact for the Head of Mission and assist the Head of Mission as required.⁵² The CC should ensure continuous liaison between the operation and all participating States, through the regular provision of information to it by the *ad hoc* group.⁵³ Also, the CC would be responsible to the CSO for the execution of tasks related to peacekeeping, where the CSO assigns such tasks to the CPC.⁵⁴

Finally, within the Forum for Security Co-operation, states would also further the process of reducing the risk of conflict. The Helsinki Decisions explicitly

use of the human dimension mechanism or the Valletta mechanism; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 722-723, chapter III, paras. 4 and 5.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 724, chapter III, para. 13; the latter refers to the rapporteur and monitoring missions in the context of measure II of the Vienna Document.

47 *Ibid.*, p. 725, chapter III, paras. 17 and 18.

48 *Ibid.*, p. 726, chapter III, para. 28.

49 In its original structure, i.e. consisting of the Consultative Committee and the CPC Secretariat.

50 Cf. Helsinki Document 1992, cited above (Note 37), p. 726, chapter III, para. 27.

51 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 727, chapter III, para. 39. The *ad hoc* group would, as a rule, consist of representatives of the preceding and the succeeding Chairmen-in-Office, of the participating States providing personnel for the mission and of participating States making other significant practical contributions to the operation.

52 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 727, chapter III, para. 40; in practical terms, this would also require access by the *ad hoc* group to the CSCE communications network in order to keep the other participating States informed.

53 Cf. *ibid.*, chapter III, para. 41.

54 Cf. *ibid.*, chapter III, para. 42.

refer to the Forum, with a strengthened CPC, as an integral part of the CSCE.⁵⁵ The participating States in the Helsinki Decisions envisage further enhancing the capability of the CPC to reduce the risks of such conflicts through relevant conflict prevention techniques.⁵⁶ The same issue is also addressed within the annexed "Programme for Immediate Action", that the CC will maintain under consideration the need for improvements in the relevant techniques⁵⁷ of conflict prevention and crisis management.

The Deployment of the First CSCE Missions and the Development of the CPC's Role in Mission Support

While the provisions on CSCE peacekeeping within the Helsinki Decisions have for the most part remained a dead letter up to now,⁵⁸ soon after these Decisions were adopted the first field operations of preventive diplomacy and crisis management were launched, which also had a significant impact on the further development of the CPC.

The spread of the armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia into Bosnia and Herzegovina and the emerging danger of escalation into armed conflict in potential crisis areas, for example, Macedonia, Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, triggered the deployment of missions which were, however, also a manifestation of the transition from traditional peacekeeping operations towards an instrument of preventive diplomacy most typical for the CSCE/OSCE.

In a first step, the Committee of Senior Officials tasked the CPC with a fact-finding mission on the military situation in Kosovo. The mission visited the region from 27 May until 2 June 1992 and reported via the CC to the CSO. While the mission found no immediate signs of escalating military tensions, it did indicate that there was indeed a danger of conflict.

The CSO then established a task force which was subsequently transformed into a steering group⁵⁹ and initiated the deployment of an exploratory mission already decided at the twelfth meeting for consideration on "the role that further CSCE missions (...) might play in promoting peace, averting violence and re-

55 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 734, chapter V, paras. 8 and 9.

56 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 736, chapter V, para. 22.

57 Cf. Annex to Chapter V, Programme for Immediate Action, *ibid.*, pp. 739-743, here: p. 742, para. 13.

58 Since 1993, a planning cell has existed for a possible future CSCE/OSCE peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. While technically speaking this cell is not a part of the CPC, it has nevertheless closely co-operated with the CPC, in particular during its initial phase. It was there that the now famous "yellow beret" was created for OSCE military personnel. It was, however, first put into use by the CPC's representative at an exercise observation in early 1994 rather than within the framework of a peacekeeping operation.

59 Cf. Committee of Senior Officials, Thirteenth CSO Meeting, Helsinki, 29 June-7 July 1992, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 2), pp. 950-952, here: p. 952. The group consisted of Austria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Germany, Greece, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom as Chair of the European Community, and the USA.

storing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandjak".⁶⁰ Upon recommendation of this mission⁶¹ the CSO at its 15th meeting on 14 August 1992 decided to establish, "in co-operation with the relevant authorities, a continuous presence in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, in the form of missions of long duration".⁶² It also welcomed the extension of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) to neighbouring countries of Serbia and Montenegro and decided to "explore with authorities in Skopje the possibility of despatch of similar missions under CSCE auspices".⁶³ With the establishment of the Missions of Long Duration, the CPC virtually stumbled into the task of mission support with the Chairman-in-Office appointing respective Heads of Mission who undertook first exploratory trips to the respective areas of responsibility.⁶⁴ When the respective Heads of Mission reported to the 16th Meeting of the CSO, their reports were the basis for the subsequent CSO decision to definitively deploy these Missions. While the Missions were soon after firmly established and the Mission members arrived within a few weeks and immediately started operations, in several respects they were acting in a vacuum. First, in legal terms, the respective *Memoranda of Understanding* (MoU)⁶⁵ with the host governments were still lacking and could only be concluded at the end of October/beginning of November 1992.⁶⁶ Furthermore, the CSO had taken the political decision to deploy the Missions but no decision about how to fulfil their material needs. Thus, their most urgent problem was that the Missions lacked sufficient funding, as the CSCE's regular 1992 annual budget had not been planned for such developments. Before budgets could be elaborated and authorized, only a limited start-up fund was available, deriving from surplus funds of earlier CPC functions.⁶⁷ It barely covered running expenses, for example the

60 Committee of Senior Officials, Twelfth CSO Meeting, Helsinki, 8-11 June 1992, in: *ibid.*, pp. 947-949, here: p. 948.

61 Cf. Report of the CSCE Exploratory Mission to Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandjak, 2-8 August 1992, Vienna, 9 August 1992. It should be noted that at that time Yugoslavia had already been suspended from participation in the CSCE.

62 Committee of Senior Officials, Fifteenth CSO Meeting, Prague, 13-14 August 1992, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 2), pp. 954-961, p. 959.

63 *Ibid.*, p. 960. The wording reflects the fact that due to the dispute over the name of Macedonia, Greece had objected to including this area in the ECMM mandate, as well as the fact that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had for the same reason not been admitted to the CSCE as a full-fledged participating State.

64 The author in his capacity as CPC representative and due to his relevant former military training as a logistics officer accompanied the Head of Mission for the Missions of Long Duration on this trip in order to give logistic support. Upon his return it was agreed that he establish the logistical support of this Mission from Vienna, which later directly led to the emergence of "mission support" as a task for the CPC; see below.

65 I.e. the legal instruments regulating the legal position vis-à-vis the host country with respect to their general position and the scope of their operations.

66 It was made clear, however, that concluding the MoU with the Belgrade authorities did not mean an explicit or implicit recognition of the FRY by the CSCE, or any precedent for Belgrade's position vis-à-vis the CSCE.

67 These were derived from funds for holding emergency meetings under the mechanism for consultation and co-operation as regards unusual military activities which had been as-

rent for the Missions' office, telecommunication fees, or salaries for local employees, let alone any investments in, for example, vehicles or other key equipment.⁶⁸ Furthermore, the CSO had not foreseen any elaboration of a logistical concept for the Missions.

These facts posed less of a problem for the Mission in Skopje as it had been established under American leadership and was fully supported by the US government. This type of support, however, was not given to the Missions of Long Duration. Because of the positive experience with the CPC's support during the first exploratory trip, the Head of Mission requested support again to which the CPC Secretariat reacted positively, however it did not have any formal competencies and was acting on the individual initiative of its staff members, including the author who due to his former experience became the point of contact for the Mission.⁶⁹

The main reason for this was that the CPC due to its original tasks in the military dimension had personnel with military and organizational experience at its disposal, who proved useful for mission support, too. Thus, CPC Secretariat personnel elaborated, in the first instance, a logistical concept for the Mission, in particular regarding fuel supply which was a serious problem due to the then embargo against Yugoslavia. The role within a few months expanded to support other missions which were established subsequently, providing them all with vehicles, satellite telephones, bullet-proof jackets, but also items as simple as sleeping bags.

These activities of the CPC Secretariat were at first met with criticism by a majority of delegations both in the CC and the CSO as these activities were not covered by the CPC's tasks as enumerated in the Paris Charter. Furthermore, the Missions had been established by the CSO rather than the CC and support for them was therefore regarded to be a matter for the then CSCE Secretariat in Prague rather than the CPC Secretariat in Vienna. Upon reconsideration, it was, however, realized that the formally correct solution would have meant serious disadvantages in practice.⁷⁰

As a result of these considerations, the Stockholm Council Meeting (14-15 December 1992) passed the appropriate conclusions. On the one hand, it explicitly confirmed the "(a)ctive use of missions and representatives as part of preventive

signed to the CPC before but had then been transferred to the Conference Services after the Helsinki Decisions.

68 The respective decision on a provisional budget was only taken on 14 October, with first contributions by participating States due by 1 December 1992. There was thus a serious financial gap which could only be solved by some rule bending on the part of the CPC staff, including the author. For example, cars were bought on credit privately in order to supply the Missions with the required vehicles on time.

69 While the official terminology spoke of "Missions of Long Duration", in practice they constituted one coherent structure under a single Head of Mission. Therefore, with respect to the practical arrangements, the term "Mission" will be used in the singular.

70 The CPC Secretariat pointed in its argumentation *inter alia* to the following inherent problems: The supply situation in Vienna was much better than in Prague; banking was better developed in Vienna; supply lines would have been 400 km longer from Prague.

diplomacy to promote dialogue, stability and provide for early warning"⁷¹ and endorsed the earlier CSO decisions to deploy the Missions. On the other hand, the Council now formally tasked the Conflict Prevention Centre with taking "rapid steps to strengthen its ability to provide operational support for CSCE preventive diplomacy missions and peacekeeping activities"⁷² and thereby formally established the competencies for mission support with the CPC Secretariat.

The Missions of Long Duration became, however, soon trapped in the complex and increasingly radicalized Serbian domestic politics. They also became a pawn in the FRY's bid for admission as a participating State into the CSCE. When the first MoU expired on 28 April 1993, the Yugoslav government agreed to extend the term for another two months. After that grace period, however, the MoU was no longer extended and the Missions had to be evacuated.

In reaction to these developments, an open-ended working group was established in Vienna to monitor the situation in the areas in question, and to report to the relevant CSCE bodies. The CPC Secretariat on its own initiative⁷³ supplemented the meetings with weekly situation reports compiled from open sources. Although some delegations indicated that in their view, the CPC Secretariat should limit its activities to logistical matters, the practice was nevertheless accepted.⁷⁴ This activity thus laid the ground - together with the briefing/debriefing of mission members, which had become routine in the CPC Secretariat - for a wider role of the CPC with respect to missions, beyond mere logistics.

Organizational Changes and Dissolution of the Paris Structure

The Stockholm Council Meeting in December 1992 brought significant structural changes to the CSCE, leading on the one hand to both a tighter and more hierarchical organization, but on the other, to the end of the CPC in its original shape. Decisions determined on the one hand that representatives meet regularly in Vienna between sessions of the CSO to decide on matters necessary to ensure prompt and effective implementation of CSO decisions. On the other, the decisions established the post of a Secretary General⁷⁵ and a single organizational structure for the Secretariats in Prague and Vienna under the direction of the Secretary General. His mandate included, *inter alia*, to oversee the work of the CSCE Secretariat, the CPC Secretariat, and the ODIHR, indicating the idea that the CPC in that perspective would have continued to exist in its original struc-

71 Stockholm Meeting of the CSCE Council, Stockholm, 15 December 1992, Summary of Conclusions, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 2), pp. 845-899. here: p. 846.

72 Ibid., p. 860.

73 Of the author.

74 Not least because the compilations proved a solid basis for further discussions.

75 Cf. Stockholm Meeting of the CSCE Council, cited above (Note 71), p. 859.

ture as a full-fledged institution, consisting of a representative body and a Secretariat.

At the Rome Council Meeting (30 November-1 December 1993), however, developments took a different turn. It decided to establish a Permanent Committee (PC) of the CSCE in Vienna as the body for political consultations and decision-making in Vienna, responsible to the CSO. The Permanent Committee (in the meantime renamed the "Permanent Council") replaced the previous but still informal Vienna Group and was made "responsible for the day-to-day operational tasks of the CSCE under the chairmanship of the Chairman-in-Office".⁷⁶ The Council further decided "to dissolve the Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre as set up by the Paris supplementary document and transfer its competence to the Permanent Committee and the Forum for Security Co-operation"⁷⁷ respectively. The PC would be able to hold meetings which could be convened under the mechanism on unusual military activities, while the FSC was to assume responsibilities for the implementation of CSBMs, prepare seminars on military doctrine and other such seminars as were to be agreed by the participating States, hold the annual implementation assessment meetings and provide the forum for discussion and clarification of information exchanged under agreed CSBMs.⁷⁸ There is, however, not such a clear indication on which body would replace the CC with regard to the functions assigned to it by the Helsinki Decisions with respect to peacekeeping operations.

Finally, the Council endorsed an earlier decision by the CSO to establish a CSCE Secretariat in Vienna, consisting of departments for conference services, administration and budget, Chairman-in-Office support⁷⁹ and "the Conflict Prevention Centre", i.e. the former CPC Secretariat.⁸⁰

Thus, the former CPC Secretariat also ceased to exist as a self-contained institution. Its operational core elements, consisting of the CSBM branch (including the responsibility for the data network established under the Vienna Document) and the Mission Support Section,⁸¹ established under the Stockholm Decisions,

76 CSCE Fourth Meeting of the Council, Rome, 30 November-1 December 1993, in: Arie Bloed (Ed.), *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Basic Documents, 1993-1995*, The Hague/London/Boston 1997, pp. 192-214, here: p. 207, chapter VII, para. 7.1.

77 *Ibid.*, pp. 207-208, chapter VII, para. 7.2. The terminology is formally incorrect, as the Helsinki Decisions had made the Consultative Committee one of the two manifestations of the Forum in any case. Thus, the competencies mentioned had, formally speaking, always been a "task of the Forum". However, this wording might be due to a previously established informal practice among delegations to use the term "Forum" for the "Special Committee", to delineate it from the Consultative Committee.

78 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 208, chapter VII, paras. 7.3 and 7.4.

79 The Department for Chairman-in-Office Support was later renamed "General Services" and finally integrated into the CPC.

80 Cf. CSCE Fourth Meeting of the Council, cited above (Note 76), p. 208, chapter VII, para. 8. At the same time, the employment policy shifted from secondment by the participating States towards contracted personnel. During this phase, a disproportional number of personnel from several UN institutions in Vienna were contracted, who also "imported" the less flexible standards of the UN administration.

81 The CPC Secretariat's task in mission support was formally limited to administrative/technical/logistical support. Members of the CPC, however, acquired informal com-

were incorporated into the Secretariat under the name of the "Conflict Prevention Centre", while its administrative elements, for example the branches for personnel or finances as well as the archives, were transferred into the respective branches of the newly established CSCE Secretariat.

These developments have led on the one hand to a streamlining of the former CPC Secretariat as it was now relieved of the administrative burden and could in principle have better focused on the substance of its tasks. However, on the other hand they have also led to a significant loss both of flexibility and of the ability to react quickly, as the CPC had been tied into an inflexible, bureaucratic structure, which developed a life of its own.⁸²

Tasks both Widened and Deepened

The growing number of missions also required growing support demanding a continuous increase in tasks and personnel in the new CPC's Mission Support Section. A further factor was the "quantum leap" in mission size. While the number of mission staff of the "first generation" (1992-1995) in most cases remained lower than twenty, the Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, established by the 1995 Budapest Ministerial Council Meeting in response to the manifold tasks assigned to the OSCE by the Dayton Agreement, had already increased to about 250 international staff. A few months later, the tasks taken over by the OSCE Mission to Croatia required the same number of staff. Correspondingly, tasks for mission support increased, as did the personnel requirements in mission support.⁸³ The CPC thus increasingly developed into the main hub for OSCE⁸⁴ operations within the Secretariat.

While these were the more visible developments in the CPC, leading to a widening of its operations, at the same time its original tasks with respect to the implementation of military CSBMs were deepened. The Vienna Document 1994 tasked the CPC with circulating a survey of exchanged annual information one month prior to the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) and

petence in matters, for example, like the briefing/debriefing of mission members, which were highly appreciated by mission members.

82 It was particularly negative that the newly established Department for Administration and Budget was practically entirely shaped along the lines of the UN bureaucracy and lacked the flexibility required for operative structures.

83 When Switzerland took over the OSCE Chairmanship in 1996, it also deployed a complete Headquarters Support Unit to the newly established Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, including an air transport component both within Bosnia and Herzegovina, and with two flights weekly from Basel via Vienna to Sarajevo; furthermore, movement control was established at the CPC. The joke at that time went that the OSCE, while lacking an air force, at least had an airline.

84 Because the "second generation" of missions was undertaken after the change in name, the term "OSCE" will be used for the following period.

circulating a survey of suggestions made during the AIAM within one month after the AIAM.⁸⁵

In addition, the Vienna Document 1994 in Annex V tasked the CPC with preparing, in view of the task of supporting the implementation of CSBMs assigned to it by the Charter of Paris, on a regular basis, a factual presentation of the information exchanged in accordance with the Vienna Document between all participating States. This factual presentation was to facilitate the analysis of this information by participating States and was not to entail conclusions by the CPC.⁸⁶

Further Developments

The developments that followed came in incremental steps rather than through drastic change, and mostly in the context of the structural re-organization of the Secretariat. Thus, matters on, for example, the personnel and finances of missions were at times assigned to the CPC, and at others to the relevant departments of the OSCE Secretariat.

The past few years led to further changes, reflecting both the growth of the OSCE in organizational terms, and the changed circumstances the organization has had to cope with. In 1999, the competence for logistics in mission support was transferred to a specific administrative department also responsible for the missions' financial matters. The CPC retained, however, the responsibility of recruiting, selecting and training mission personnel seconded by participating States. The latter function was only recently transferred to a newly established "Department for Human Resources", responsible for all personnel matters.

The only function that remained constant was the original CPC task of supporting the implementation of agreed CSBMs, as there was no space for overlapping with other departments.⁸⁷ When the Forum for Security Co-operation in 2000 negotiated and finally adopted the Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), the CPC was tasked to support these activities within the OSCE, and a SALW expert was contracted.

85 Cf. Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (Ed.), OSCE-Yearbook 1995/1996, Baden-Baden 1997, pp. 431-482, here: p. 473, paras. 147 and 147.1. These new tasks to a certain degree formally endorsed a practice undertaken informally at earlier Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings by the CPC, where the author compiled and made available whole transcripts of the proceedings. Delegations then on the occasion of each meeting formally requested the CPC Secretariat to compile a list of proposals for further negotiations, which finally became a formal task enshrined in the Vienna Document

86 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 478, Annex V. Many participating States were reluctant to support such ideas which had been raised during the negotiations on improving the Vienna Document.

87 This branch within the CPC also for a long time had a constant number of personnel, with one officer covering exchanged information and representing the CPC, on invitation, at CSBM events, as well as one officer for the Communications Network.

While these changes remained mostly incremental, there were changes in quality with regard to mission support. While earlier attempts to establish a kind of "desk officer" system for the respective missions at the CPC were met with resistance by delegations who did not want to give the CPC what they considered a "political" function, this function nevertheless developed out of necessity in an informal way, and was finally also endorsed at the formal level when the so-called "Mission Liaison Officers"⁸⁸ were established. While their official function still would have been limited to acting as a point of contact to the respective mission(s)⁸⁹ within the Secretariat, *de facto* they developed all criteria for a "desk" for their mission area.

A real quantum leap was, however, brought to the CPC when the Kosovo Verification Mission was deployed based on the Holbrooke-Milošević Agreement in October 1998, which invited the OSCE to deploy a monitoring mission to supervise the cease-fire.⁹⁰ The corresponding decision by the Permanent Council aimed at a 2,000 observers,⁹¹ however, this number has never been reached. To give support to this Mission, a "Kosovo Verification Mission Support Unit" (KVM-SU) was established in the CPC and served as an operations centre. And for the first time, it also encompassed an analysis unit and a situation room, staffed around the clock.

When after the end of the armed conflict the KVM was replaced by another mission (the OSCE Mission in Kosovo/OMIK)⁹² following the more traditional pattern of previous OSCE missions, the situation room became integrated into the CPC. The Istanbul Summit decided to "set up an Operation Centre within the Conflict Prevention Centre (...) which can be expanded rapidly when required. Its role will be to plan and deploy field operations (...) and to liaise with other international organizations and institutions as appropriate in accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security".⁹³ The Operation Centre now consists of a Plans Staff and a Situation Room, staffed around the clock, and thus provides a stable link between the missions and the Secretariat as well as to the Chairman-in-Office.

88 Later renamed "Mission Programme Officers".

89 Some cover an area where several missions are deployed, as was the case with the Missions to Estonia and Latvia, disbanded at the end of 2001.

90 As to its tasks and size, it would have been more apt to call this "mission" a peacekeeping operation, in accordance with the Helsinki Decisions.

91 Cf. PC.DEC/263. When the Mission had to be withdrawn after the failure of the Rambouillet and Paris talks in March 1999, there had never been more than 1,600 observers on the ground.

92 Established on 1 July 1999 by PC.DEC/305.

93 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter for European Security, Istanbul, November 1999, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (Ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2000, Baden-Baden 2001, pp. 425-443, here: p. 438, para. 43.

Concluding Remarks

The development of the CPC is a visible indicator for the development of the OSCE from its earliest steps towards institutionalization to today's functions and structures. The original CPC was the first institution consisting both of a representative body of all participating States and an administrative structure (the Secretariat). Thus to a certain degree, even at its origins it anticipated the present structure of the OSCE as a whole.

Furthermore, it was in the then CPC Secretariat that an early course towards CSCE/OSCE operational capability was set. This was first called for because of the CPC Secretariat's supporting role in the framework of military emergency mechanisms, compelling it to be available immediately due to the mechanisms' narrow time frame. It found its continuation in the initiatives undertaken by Secretariat personnel to establish logistics and support for the missions even before a formal basis existed, not to speak of the lack of administrative preparations or personnel employed for that purpose. These steps provided the basis for the CPC's function in mission support, which was assigned to the CPC only later by the Stockholm Decisions.

In a similar way, actions by the CPC Secretariat staff, undertaken without a formal mandate and mostly on their own initiative, created the basis for the CPC's role in mission liaison which was only later endorsed by the respective decisions. They encompassed providing compilations of factual information on the mission areas of the inoperable Missions of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina as well as the briefing/debriefing of mission members, but also by supplying the missions with background information about events in the mission areas, and they laid the groundwork for a growing understanding of the CPC as a "control instrument" for the missions, which was finally formalized in the Istanbul decisions.

Finally, the CPC was also the point of departure for the incremental increase in the concentration of the Organization's work in Vienna. When it was first founded as an instrument for consultation among participating States on the implementation of military CSBMs, it was a practical necessity to co-locate it with the ongoing Negotiations on CSBMs in Vienna. On the other hand, when the Negotiations were replaced by the Forum for Security Co-operation, the very existence of the CPC and its Consultative Committee in Vienna made it then imperative to establish the FSC in the same place, too.

This, in turn induced informal consultations by the participating States' delegations to the FSC in preparing the CSO meetings, which further led to the emergence of the CSO's "Vienna Group". It developed subsequently into the Permanent Committee, to become renamed the "Permanent Council" by the Budapest Summit Meeting. While this body increasingly gained decision-making capabilities, the relevance of the formerly quite significant Committee of Senior Officials⁹⁴ in Prague decreased correspondingly, shifting the centre

94 Renamed into "Senior Council" at the 1994 Budapest Summit.

of gravity for the Organization's decision-making more and more to Vienna. Correspondingly, the administrative central structures moved to Vienna, too. While the original CSCE Secretariat in 1991 had been co-located with the CSO in Prague, the Secretary General and the unified (new) CSCE Secretariat were finally co-located with the main decision-making body, the Permanent Committee/Council in Vienna.

Today's CPC appears to have little similarity with its original shape and function. Viewed superficially, it appears to have lost most of these characteristics. It has been stripped of its representative body, the Consultative Committee. In contrast to other administrative institutions as for example the ODIHR or the High Commissioner on National Minorities, which have retained their autonomy, the former CPC Secretariat has also lost its autonomy and become incorporated into the Secretariat with the mere rank of a department. The question may arise whether this torso is still entitled to bear the name of a "Conflict Prevention Centre" at all, or whether this term is nothing more than a nostalgic symbol reminiscent of a greater past.

On the other hand, it is manifest that the Centre's original task in conflict prevention has now become a task for all OSCE institutions. The OSCE has, with all its bodies, institutions and operations, become an archetypal organization of co-operative security and thus of conflict prevention in its original sense. As the operative institutions to control all these activities have been concentrated in one department of the Secretariat named the "Conflict Prevention Centre", the term appears justified also ten years later, despite all the changes outlined above.