

Ten Years of Verification - Developments and Perspectives

Terrorism and the New European Order

For over twelve years, Europe from the Atlantic to (at least) the Urals, has been awaiting the new order. EU and NATO enlargement processes do not include the successor states of the former Soviet Union,¹ and only shifts the fault lines underlying the East-West conflict a few kilometres to the East. The relationship between the EU and the CIS is barely given a thought, at best in the EU Commission.

The community of interests between East and West, which emerged as a reaction to the outset of large-scale terrorism, however, cannot replace addressing the new European order. This would demand permanent structures whereas the alliance against terror reflects only one constellation which is variable and adaptable. If one wants to prevent violence from again becoming a means to solve conflict one must remove its causes.

These include the anarchic structure of every international system.² If it is not replaced by an order that builds clarity and mutual trust, the security dilemma will inevitably return:³ Due to the lack of orders of this kind, states do not have any other choice, but to prepare for defence even if this leads their neighbours to suspecting they are preparing to attack and thus arming themselves correspondingly, which decreases security rather than increasing it. Those who conduct a comprehensive information exchange and co-operate will cut down on insecurity enabling them to escape this dilemma. Both these reduce the security dilemma and create the most important prerequisite for a state order that avoids violence.⁴

Generated by existing arms control agreements and related verification systems, this fortunate circumstance has been present in Europe for ten years. However, in politics, this has not been registered. Perhaps it does not fit in with certain interests; it is more probable however that in politics, there is not even awareness of the significant progress that was made after 1990 through disarmament and arms control measures; the security dilemma in Europe no

1 See, for example, Adrian Hyde-Price, *Germany and European Order. Enlarging NATO and the EU*, Manchester University Press 2000.

2 For a neo-realistic view on this see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading/Mass. 1979.

3 This term was coined by John H. Herz, *Idealistic Internationalism and the Security Dilemma*, in: *World Politics* 2/1950, pp. 157-180.

4 Every international organization produces this effect, which is why the OSCE is so important for Europe. On this see Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Kluge Macht. Außenpolitik für das 21. Jahrhundert [Intelligent Power. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century]*, Munich 1999, pp. 109ff.

longer exists. This has not only laid the most important foundation for a new European order, but also tested a new model, which could be implemented with similar effects in other regions of the world. This is reason enough to deal with the situation, which is better than had been estimated and would offer more politically than is being demanded of it.

The CFE Treaty and Its Verification System

After the end of the Cold War had changed the political climate between East and West from confrontation to partnership, the interest in arms control immediately switched over to a willingness to disarm. Within the framework of the CSCE, the NATO and WTO states concluded the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe on 19 November 1990⁵ calling for a reduction of their conventional weapons systems and adopted the “Concluding Act” on 10 July 1992⁶, which called for a reduction in military personnel. The States Parties committed themselves not only to exchanging detailed information on the progress of disarmament (Article XIII of the CFE Treaty); they also entitled one another the reciprocal right to conduct inspections at any time. Accepting such inspections, which guaranteed verification of compliance with the Treaty, became an obligation (Article XIV of the CFE Treaty). This control system was adopted in the “Concluding Act” for the verification of personnel cuts (Section IV). Thus, for the first time in the history of conventional disarmament, an information system was introduced that could be verified on a continual basis through on-site inspections.

Since then there has been an annual information exchange between the States Parties to the CFE Treaty on their defence budgets, armaments, equipment and personnel. This is supplemented with a myriad of additional information and explanations, which offer detailed clarification of the database in special areas, for example research and development. These data records are very extensive. The report of the Federal Armed Forces Verification Centre for the year 1999 contains, for example, 192 sources itemizing military sites, personnel strengths and weapons systems deployed.

The exchange of this information and the opportunity to verify it mutually on site made for a “surprisingly positive experience”⁷ from the start. The inspectors gained a comprehensive impression of the discipline, the organization, the condition of the equipment and the military strength of each unit visited. Over the years, all States Parties obtained a precise picture that emerged like

5 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Paris, 19 November 1990, in: Arie Bloed (Ed.), *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993*, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1993, pp. 1223-1253.

6 Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 5), pp. 1255-1269.

7 Heinz Kluss, *Die Abrüstung konventioneller Streitkräfte und ihre Kontrolle. Erste praktische Erfahrungen [Disarmament of Conventional Armed Forces and Its Control. First Practical Experience]*, in: *Europa-Archiv* 6/1993, pp. 167-178 (author's translation).

a mosaic of the overall condition of the armed forces of the other States Parties. In addition, soldiers became acquainted with one another. Their discussions during numerous inspections have “to a certain extent underpinned and supplemented the dialogue conducted between politicians and diplomats at the highest level on topical security issues and on the future concept of common security. Thanks to the fact that one can ascertain on site at any time that one is not being deceived, unfounded distrust is nipped in the bud from the start.”⁸

From the date the Treaty provisionally entered into force on 17 July 1992 up until 1999, there were around 5,700 inspections performed between all States Parties to the Treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany took part by heading more than 400 inspections in the Eastern States Parties as well as escorting more than 500 inspections conducted by other States Parties in Germany. Furthermore, German inspectors took part as guests in over 700 inspections carried out under the responsibility of another State Party, also of the Eastern group.

The value of this information and these inspections and their contribution to a qualitative change in the assessment of the international situation is equally highly appreciated among all the military forces of the States Parties. The information and verification regime has proved its worth.⁹ A high degree of transparency, trust and predictability was reflected in these reciprocal inspections, particularly because as a rule they confirmed the written information already submitted. However, they also went beyond this to the extent that one was able to also inspect paramilitary forces, civil institutions and infrastructures that were not covered by the information compiled on the armed forces. Of course, a few “grey zone” areas remained - namely those affected by civil war which made them inaccessible for inspection. This applied in particular to the crisis areas in the Caucasus as well as in Moldova. Nevertheless, one should make a note of the fact that in the opinion of all militaries, in the East as well as the West, the implementation of the CFE Treaty represents a “success story”. The mutual mistrust in existence before the “*Wende*”, which poisoned the atmosphere and drove the actors to armament, had dwindled.

The inspections agreed in the CFE Treaty and conducted according to it were supplemented in 1992 with a much more sophisticated programme made up of confidence-building measures. The Forum for Security Co-operation, established in 1992 at the CSCE Helsinki Summit,¹⁰ decided to further develop

8 Ibid. (author’s translation).

9 In my evaluation, I am relying upon information that was made known to me during my visit to the Federal Armed Forces Verification Centre in Geilenkirchen near Aachen. At this point, I would like to thank the members of the Centre, in particular the Commander, General Gernot Hübner, for sharing this information.

10 On the creation and development of the Forum see Matthias Z. Karádi, Das Forum für Sicherheitskooperation [The Forum for Security Co-operation], in: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg [Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg]/IFSH (Ed.), OSZE-Jahrbuch [OSCE Yearbook] 1996, Baden-Baden 1996, pp. 379-391.

the Vienna Document; in 1994, the new version, valid to date, was finalized, although it has been supplemented many times (last in 1999).

The Forum for Security Co-operation, however, did even more. It attempted to take advantage of the conversion of confrontation into co-operation, which had emerged through the end of the Cold War, to erect a new European security architecture. For that purpose, it drafted a Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and formulated the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers. Although this was already a very ambitious programme, the Forum went beyond the limits of the feasible, evidently by having the Code of Conduct not only attempt to regulate the foreign policy of states, but also the function and the role of their armed forces in domestic policy. As noble as these aspirations were, this direct intervention in the sovereignty of states failed.¹¹ Also the opportunity for inspections by other participating States provided for in Article 38 of the Code remained without practical consequence as did the document as a whole.¹²

The Vienna Document and Its Assessment

The Vienna Document of 1994, however, dealt almost exclusively with listing detailed rules for intensive reciprocal observation. It established an annual exchange of military information in which the states share intelligence on their defence policy, armed forces planning, military expenditures and armament budgets. The Federal Republic of Germany - for example - for the first time in 1994, still within the framework of the Forum for Security Co-operation, made this kind of information available; as of 1995, the Federal Republic has issued extensive annual reports on these topics.¹³ In its report on the armed forces, the Federal Republic offers information on major weapon and equipment systems, on deployment plans for these systems, on

11 On the previous history of this see Klaus Achmann, *Kooperative Sicherheit: Neue Grundsatzdokumente* [Co-operative Security: New Basic Documents], in: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg [Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg]/IFSH (Ed.), *OSZE-Jahrbuch* [OSCE Yearbook] 1995, Baden-Baden 1995, pp. 307-320.

12 On this see Jonathan Dean, *The OSCE "Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security": A Good Idea, Imperfectly Executed, Weakly Followed-up*, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (Ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 1995/1996*, Baden-Baden 1997, pp. 291-298, p. 295, 298; the Code of Conduct can be found in: *Budapest Document 1994*, Budapest, 6 December 1994, in: Arie Bloed (Ed.), *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Basic Documents, 1993-1995*, The Hague/London/Boston 1997, pp. 145-189, Chapter IV: Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, pp. 161-167

13 Bundesrepublik Deutschland, *Jährlicher Austausch militärischer Information über Streitkräfte gemäß Wiener Dokument 1994* [Federal Republic of Germany, Annual Exchange of Military Information on the Armed Forces According to the Vienna Document 1994], yearly. Idem, *Wiener Dokument 1994, Jährlicher Austausch militärischer Information, Verteidigungsplanung* [Vienna Document 1994, Annual Exchange of Military Information, Defence Planning], Bonn, yearly.

planned increases in personnel strength as well as the temporary activation of non-active troop formations.

In its report on defence planning, the Federal Republic gives an account of the changes in the structure of the Federal Armed Forces and its command structure, although only roughly of course. It describes previous plans and how they have developed, it reports in detail on military expenditures in the past fiscal year and on budget plans for the five coming years.

Every country has the right to verify this data by conducting evaluation visits. These supplement the inspections also planned for every state, of which each country must allow at least three per year. Thus for example, from November 1995 to December 1996, the NATO states carried out a total of 363 inspections in the Eastern States Parties within the framework of the CFE Treaty.¹⁴

In addition, within the framework of the Vienna Document, another 23 inspections and 66 evaluations were performed by the group of Western states in 1996. In turn, the group of Eastern states conducted 226 inspections and received visits from 253 Western inspection teams in 1996. In 1994, as many as 475 inspections were conducted.

Most of these inspections and evaluations were multinational, that is, each inspection was realized by several states jointly and not just one state alone; thus, especially the small states could also become involved. Over and above this, the credibility of these inspections increased. If one again uses the Federal Republic of Germany and the year 1996 as an example, during that year and within the framework of the Vienna Document 1994, the Federal Republic implemented eight inspections in Russia and other states of the former Warsaw Pact. In addition, there were five evaluations, one of these again in Russia. For its part, the Federal Republic hosted three inspections and four evaluations in 1996.¹⁵

If one sums up all inspections and evaluations within the framework of the CFE and the Vienna Document that the treaty partners were subjected to in 1996, this results in a total of 1,072 inspections between East and West, while in 1994, the total was 1,481. Although in detail - for example in regulating photography or financing - these evaluations are in need of improvement, the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in May 1996 in Vienna was able to ascertain that a "high degree of transparency in military relations" had been established, which "led to greater predictability and confidence in security relations".¹⁶

14 Cf. Auswärtiges Amt [German Foreign Office], Bericht zur Rüstungskontrolle, Abrüstung und Nichtverbreitung [Report on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation] 1996, p. 25.

15 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 98.

16 Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength, Vienna, 15-31 May 1996, in: *The Arms Control Reporter* 1996, pp. 407.D. 87-100, here: p. 407.D.88.

Table: Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe

Development of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe					
Helsinki 75	Stockholm 86	Vienna 90	Vienna 92	Vienna 94	Vienna 99
-----	-----	ANNUAL INFORMATION Land/Air forces: Structure/strength; planned deployments; budget	ANNUAL INFORMATION Details/ACV ¹⁾ Activation for non-active forces Data on weapons/ photographs	ANNUAL INFORMATION Defence planning budgets, "white books": Re- quest for clarifications	ANNUAL INFORMATION Information on mil. Forces; data, plans for deployment (defence planning etc. moved to next separate chapter)
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	DEFENCE PLANNING Defence planning, bud- gets, white books; Re- quest for clarification
-----	-----	RISK REDUCTION Consultation/emerg- ency mechanism (CPC) ²⁾ ; points of contact	RISK REDUCTION Same as VD ³⁾ 90 Voluntary hosting of visits to dispel con- cerns	RISK REDUCTION Same as VD ³⁾ 92	RISK REDUCTION UMA meetings only bilateral, at joint ses- sion of FSC ⁴⁾ and PC ⁵⁾ , chaired by CIO ⁶⁾
EXCHANGE by in- vitation including visits by military delegations	-----	CONTACTS Air base visits	CONTACTS Same as VD ³⁾ 90	CONTACTS Joint exercises, train- ing etc.; Info on co- operation agreements	CONTACTS Provision on informa- tion on contacts/annual plans

PRIOR NOTIFICATION (voluntary) of "major manoeuvres": -21 days; -25.000 troops; of "other manoeuvres" or "major military movements"	PRIOR NOTIFICATION (obligatory) of "military activities": -42 days; -13.000 troops or 300 comb. tks. in div or 3.000 troops ab/amphib. landing: Information Detail (div level)	PRIOR NOTIFICATION Same as Stockholm Information Brig/Reg level	PRIOR NOTIFICATION Same as Stockholm -9.000 troops or 250 comb. tks: division structure; Information same as VD ³⁾ 90	PRIOR NOTIFICATION Use of network; Same as VD ³⁾ 92, plus: 500 ACVs ¹⁾ ; 250 arty pieces ACV ¹⁾ notifiable	PRIOR NOTIFICATION Same as VD ³⁾ 94
EXCHANGE of Observers (voluntary) on reciprocity	OBSERVATIONS (obligatory), -17.000 troops, or -5.000 troops ab/amphib. landing; Contact to forces, "code of conduct" for observers	OBSERVATIONS Same as Stockholm; Improved Security for observers Contacts improved	OBSERVATIONS -13.000 troops or 300 comb. tks; or 3.500 troops ab/amphib. landing; same as VD ³⁾ 90	OBSERVATIONS Use of network; Same as VD ³⁾ 92, plus: 500 ACVs ¹⁾ ; 250 arty pieces Modalities moved to Annex II	OBSERVATIONS Same as VD ³⁾ 94 250 arty pieces; responsibilities may be delegated to other State(s) engaged in activity
-----	ANNUAL CALENDARS of planned notifiable activities	ANNUAL CALENDARS Negative reply to be provided	ANNUAL CALENDARS Same as VD ³⁾ 90	ANNUAL CALENDARS Number of activities	ANNUAL CALENDARS Same as VD ³⁾ 94
-----	CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS notify 40.000/1 year 75.000/2 years in advance	CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS notify 40.000/1 year 40.000/2 years in advance	CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS Limits on activities (more than 40.000/than 13.000, depending on frequency)	CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS Same as VD ³⁾ 92 Use of network	CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS Parameters for artillery pieces

Development of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe (continued)					
Helsinki 75	Stockholm 86	Vienna 90	Vienna 92	Vienna 94	Vienna 99
-----	VERIFICATION On-site inspection (max. 3 times/year) if compliance with agreed measures is in doubt	VERIFICATION Inspection same as Stockholm Evaluation of annual information on armed forces/quotas (1 per 60 units)	VERIFICATION Multinational inspec- tion teams; Evaluation of non-ac- tive forces	VERIFICATION No more "doubt"; Info on quotas; Equal standards for inspections and evaluation visits	VERIFICATION Time-frame for re- quests Obligation for inspec- ted third State forces cooperate; max. 2 evaluation visits/month
-----	-----	COMMUNICATION Network for emergen- cies and CSBM ⁷⁾ mes- sages	COMMUNICATION Same as VD ³⁾ 90	COMMUNICATION Regulations for lang- uages; working group	COMMUNICATION (removed to separate Document)
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	REGIONAL MEASURES voluntary; in accord- ance with OSCE prin- ciples add to transpar- ency and confidence no detrimental to third Parties
-----	-----	AIAM ⁸⁾ "Consultative Com- mittee"	AIAM Same as VD ³⁾ 90	AIAM Active role for CPC ²⁾	AIAM Increased role for CPC ²⁾

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Source: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ), Vol. XXXVIII, No. 6, November/December 2000.

Abbreviations: 1) ACV - Armed Combat Vehicles; 2) CPC - Conflict Prevention Centre Vienna; 3) VD - Vienna Document; 4) FSC - Forum for Security Co-operation; 5) PC - Permanent Council; 6) CIO - Chairman-in-Office; 7) CSBM - Confidence- and Security-Building Measures; 8) Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.

The evaluations, the main component of the confidence-building measures of the Vienna Document 1994, gradually lost importance in the course of the conventional disarmament evolving in Europe, particularly because the states' reports on their armed forces and planning had proved correct. Likewise, the number of military activities subject to notification and observation decreased further after 1994 because they no longer fit into the political landscape. Furthermore, they were too expensive and elaborate and were easily replaced with simulations in which smaller troop formations whose numbers were under the threshold for observation participated. In contrast, inspections involving certain "specified areas" increased in importance. Such an area encompasses after all/at the utmost that of an army so that the participating States are capable of gaining information on troop deployment and their degree of readiness in a sufficiently large area. These inspections have since 1995 been definitively established as "coequal verification instruments".

After the security-policy landscape had as a result of troop reductions and decreases in the number of military exercises changed, the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation made efforts to link up the various comprehensive treaties, in particular the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document.¹⁷ As far as the Vienna Document is concerned, this has had an effect on the communications network with points of contact in every state as well as the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting. With regard to the CFE Treaty, it has influenced the NATO database VERITY, from which however, in particular the members of the NATO "Partnership for Peace" programme have profited. However, due to its one-sided link with the Western military alliance, this programme differs qualitatively from the verification measures within the framework of the CFE and the Vienna Document. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany offers seminars for the military from Eastern OSCE States as a confidence-building measure. Moreover, one must also consider the countless bilateral co-operation programmes that the Western OSCE participating States offer those parties interested from the Eastern States Parties. The opening of the OSCE participating States allowing mutual assessment of their military and defence policies, which had been created by the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document 1994 (which in 1999 was newly supplemented in favour of regional co-operation structures¹⁸), was rounded out by the agreement of the Forum for Security Co-operation of 28 November 1994 on the annual "Global Exchange of Military Information" and through the "Open Skies" programme. The agreement on the global exchange compels the OSCE participating States to provide information not only on their mili-

17 Cf. Walter Jürgen Schmid/Michael Klepsch, On the Path to a European Security Architecture - The Contribution of the Forum for Security Co-operation, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (Ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1997, Baden-Baden 1998, pp. 299-305.

18 Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, 16 November 1999, in: The Arms Control Reporter 1999, pp. 402.D.196-232, in particular pp. 402.D.228-230. Also the sections on "Inspections" and "Evaluations" were supplemented.

tary potential deployed in the main area of the Treaty between the Atlantic and the Urals, but also on their worldwide presence. Ground and air forces as well as naval forces located outside OSCE space must be notified to the other participating States.

Aerial Verification

The “Treaty on Open Skies” of 24 March 1992¹⁹ was signed in Helsinki by 16 NATO states and ten Eastern states. It is closely linked to OSCE security- and confidence-building measures, but does not belong within their framework. It allows the States Parties to conduct reciprocal observation flights, thus putting them in a position to regularly observe the entire national territory of a State Party from the air. The Treaty did not come into force for a long period of time because Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan did not ratify it until 1996. Nevertheless, the Treaty has been implemented since 1993 because the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) has regularly renewed the “provisional application” foreseen as an interim solution in Article XVIII. Since then, about 300 observation flights have taken place.²⁰

Since 2002, after the Russians signed the Treaty, the co-operative character of the aerial observation regime has fit into the arrangements of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document. The resulting data from test flights is not subject to military secrecy and is thus free of the suspicion it would serve national or unilateral security interests. Because this data is compiled based on rules recognized by all sides, it cannot be questioned but may even be presented as “official evidence by international bodies”.²¹ This contribution to confidence building is the real value of observation from the “Open Skies”. As a common action by the States Parties, it serves not to gain one-sided advantages but to create reciprocal assurance that security policy advantages are not being sought.

The Results: Transparency and Certainty

In concert with the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty, particularly the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document have created such a high degree of certainty and co-operation in the geographical area where so many European wars have arisen that the most important cause of violence, namely the uncertainty about the conduct of neighbours due to anarchy, can be seen as

19 Treaty on Open Skies, Helsinki, 24 March 1992, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 5), pp. 1271-1311.

20 Cf. Ernst Britting, Rüstungskontrolle im „Offenen Himmel“ [Arms Control under “Open Skies”], in: Europäische Sicherheit 6/2000, pp. 15-17.

21 Ibid., p. 17 (author’s translation).

having been eliminated. Transparency reigns based on reliable and controlled information. The latter is collected at the decisive operational level, where the deployment of weapons systems and soldiers offers information on the political intentions of states. As it is the military who must initially judge what the degree of existing security and/or danger is, and because any intention of aggression must inevitably find expression in a change in military planning, the information gained within the framework of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document are of constructive importance. If all States Parties continually provide information to one another on their military potential and allow this information to be verified, the security dilemma generated by system anarchy will cease to exist. This primary cause of violence was successfully reduced during the period of analysis from 1992-1996. The CFE Treaty had "established a high degree of transparency in military relations through its comprehensive system for exchange of information and for verification". The "capability for launching surprise attack and the danger of large-scale offensive action in Europe as a whole have been diminished substantially".²² The Vienna Document has brought about "increased transparency and mutual confidence as regards the military forces and military activities of all OSCE participating States".²³

Thus, the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document can prevent the return of war. The military experts are in agreement on this assessment. "The armed forces in Europe are today more transparent than ever before in their structure, hierarchy as well as personnel and equipment (...) Fulfilling commitments in the information area has been a problem in a few states only (...) The safety in the application of predominantly political instruments to reduce risks has grown as the more recent inner-European crises have been dealt with by arms control policy."²⁴

Of course in this connection, we must also mention those organizations not regionally oriented but having a special purpose, which although they serve other goals also radiate transparency, disseminate information and in this respect also increase certainty within their geographical scope. Above all, this is NATO, which will no doubt be joined in the next few years by seven new member states. This is, with particular importance for the sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union, the Partnership for Peace programme, which still plays the most important role in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council that emerged out of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council in 1997. One must also mention the NATO-Russia partnership which gained increasing impor-

22 Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, cited above (Note 16), p. 407.D.88.

23 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Lisbon, 1996, Lisbon Document 1996, in: OSCE-Yearbook 1997, cited above (Note 17), pp. 419-446, here: p. 432.

24 This evaluation, which was made available to me in November 2000 through the German Foreign Office, stems from Klaus-Peter Kohlhas, Colonel (G.S.), Federal Armed Forces Verification Centre. I would like to thank the author and all institutions for sharing this information with me; (author's translation).

tance in May 2002 under the influence of the fight against terrorism, but which is still not identical to membership.

Even if the Western military alliance is transformed through enlargement and transformation in such a way that pessimists describe it as “dead” and optimists as a political new birth, it will in Article V retain its military, externally directed core, and through its American leadership, it will maintain its political orientation. Both these differ objectively from the efforts of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document causing an internal effect in order to create non-discriminating, region-wide working efforts for transparency, to gain information and build confidence.

Which Security Architecture?

Thus, in the Euro-Atlantic region, especially at the centre of this region, a paradoxical as well as unsatisfactory situation prevails. There is a foundation of mutual security and confidence, but there is no political superstructure. This has yielded no corresponding edifice, but the emergence of a tangle of several isolated political containers. Because they serve various purposes, the foundation could even become damaged. Thus, it is all the more urgent to find an overall architecture which does not eliminate organizations with a special purpose, but sustains and arches over them and in this manner guarantees that the CFE and OSCE achievement, namely generating security through co-operation and transparency, determines the building plan for the new European order.²⁵

Of course, this is easier said than done. First, however, one must at least demand this in order to introduce the project into the political discussion and ensure it is placed high on the agenda. NATO and EU enlargement should no longer be discussed without taking into consideration the overall European architecture.

Theoretically, the easiest solution would be to develop it from the already existing OSCE. The OSCE could provide the place where those organizations that are components of and reduce uncertainty in the European system, introduce, bring together and co-ordinate their contributions. Out of this, a multilaterally institutionalized but also very flexible regulatory procedure would emerge, which in the contemporary discussion has become known as “governance”.²⁶ For this purpose, the OSCE would of course have to acquire the

25 I have made detailed statements on the confidence-building effects of also these types of organizations as well as the general theme in: Ernst-Otto Czempel, *Neue Sicherheit in Europa. Eine Kritik an Neorealismus und Realpolitik* [New Security in Europe. A Critique of Neorealism and Realpolitik], *Studien der Hessischen Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung* [Studies of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)], Vol. 37, Frankfurt/New York 2002.

26 James N. Rosenau, *Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics*, in: James N. Rosenau/Ernst-Otto Czempel (Eds.), *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press 1992, pp. 1ff.

legal form of an international organization and the corresponding bodies. The fact that a further development of the OSCE in this direction faces huge problems and great resistance should not lead to totally discontinuing all reflection on it.

Because one cannot expect that Russia will become a full member of NATO and that at the same time NATO will change into an organization directed towards having an internal effect, the European Union ought to make efforts to achieve part of a political solution, which regulates its relations with Russia but subsequently also with the other members of the CIS. There is already an organized political dialogue with Russia within the framework of the 1994 Agreement on Partnership and Co-operation, which extends to the working level. In the years 2000 and 2001, this dialogue was broadened considerably so that it grew into a regime. The "Common Strategy" on Russia decided upon by the European Union in 1999 also belongs to this. This institutionalized contact should be maintained and deepened, particularly because on the Western side, the Russian image that emerged during the Cold War has not been fully updated, and on the Russian side, not all mistrust that the European Union is a representative of NATO has diminished.²⁷

The Union however should not lose sight of the other successor states to the former Soviet Union. Their relationship to Russia is difficult but certainly of importance for the Union. The security policy dimension of this space is managed so to speak by the Partnership for Peace programme. However, it does not take any special consideration of the circumstances created by the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document. Correspondingly, there are too few provisions for the political dimension. The European Union ought to give this dimension more attention, draft a framework for relations that is tailored to the transparency already achieved in this space and that is capable of sustaining and strengthening it.

27 For a Russian viewpoint see Vladimir Baranovsky, *Russia's Attitudes Towards the EU: Political Aspects*, Helsinki/Berlin 2002.