

A Future Security Agenda for Europe: The Work of the SIPRI Independent Working Group

Introduction

The debate within the multilateral European security organizations (NATO, and EU/WEU, and the OSCE) on their future roles in the security sphere became a starting point for the decisions taken at the CSCE Summit Meeting held in Budapest in December 1994.¹ That meeting initiated a broad discussion on a model based upon CSCE principles as reflected in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, 1990 Charter of Paris and the Helsinki Document 1992. The aim was to elaborate a "Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty- First Century".² Having long been engaged in the study of international security issues, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) was encouraged by OSCE representatives as well as by senior political officials from a number of countries to contribute to this discussion. In the autumn of 1995 SIPRI established an "Independent Working Group (IWG) on a Future Security Agenda for Europe". The intention was to bring together a diverse group of prominent scholars and current and former diplomats and politicians whose deliberations would yield fresh perspectives on the central security challenges confronting Europe as it approaches the new century.

In co-operation with several leading independent research institutes, SIPRI convened three meetings of the IWG, focusing on different aspects of the emerging European security agenda.³ In all, nearly 60 participants from vari-

1 Numerous reports have appeared addressing this subject. See, for example: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), *The European Security Community (ESC). The Security Model for the Twenty-First Century*, Baden-Baden 1996; U. Nerlich, *NATO at the Crossroads Once Again: NATO's Future Functions, Structure and Outreach*, (SWP-S406), Ebenhausen 1995; B. Meyer, *NATO Enlargement: Path to Unity or to a New Division of Europe?*, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, PRIF report no. 38, June 1995; A. Ananicz/P. Grudzinski/A. Olechowski/J. Onyszkiewicz/K. Skubiszewski/H. Szlajfer, *Report Poland-NATO*, Warsaw 1995; Finnish Council of State, *Security in a Changing World*, July 1995; *Should NATO Expand? Report of an Independent Task Force* (Harold Brown, chairman), sponsored by the US Council on Foreign Relations, New York 1995; and R.D. Asmus/R.L. Kugler/S. Larrabee, *NATO expansion: the next steps*, in: *Survival* 1/1995, pp. 7-73.

2 CSCE Budapest Document 1994, Budapest, 6 December 1994, in: Arie Bloed (Ed.), *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Basic Documents, 1993-1995*, The Hague/London/Boston 1997, pp. 145-189, p. 173.

3 The first, "brainstorming" session took place in Budapest (2 December 1995), in co-operation with the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs and the Central European University. The second meeting was held in Moscow (12-13 April 1996) in co-operation with the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). The third meeting was held in Geneva (23-24 May 1996) in co-operation with the Programme for

ous academic and research institutions, governments and international organizations in Europe and the USA were engaged in the work of the Group. They participated in their personal capacities, that is, not as representatives of their respective governments or organizations.

The project culminated with the presentation in Stockholm in October 1996 of a final report, *A Future Security Agenda for Europe*, based upon the deliberations of the IWG.⁴ The final report, along with the summaries of the IWG meetings, was made available at the request of the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna to all delegations of the 54 OSCE participating States. Some of the recommendations contained in the IWG Report were eventually reflected in the Lisbon OSCE Summit Document of December 1996.⁵

Mandate of the Independent Working Group

In forming the IWG, SIPRI's intention was to not duplicate the work on a future security model being undertaken in Vienna under the auspices of the OSCE. The aim was to make a modest contribution to defining the principles and norms guiding an emerging co-operative security system in Europe and to identify the main risks and challenges that system will have to address. Rather than produce a menu of detailed policy prescriptions, the IWG set out to raise a set of key issues and questions that should be considered by policy makers. In particular, it set out to conceptualize the problems of consolidating a co-operative security system in Europe and to draw attention to issues which are often dismissed by diplomatic practitioners as being distant or abstract, not to mention inconvenient, in comparison with the need to solve pressing current problems. In doing so, the hope was to offer a longer-term perspective on the direction of the multilateral security process in Europe - recognizing, as Henry Kissinger has pointed out, that "when an international order first comes into being, many choices may be open to it" but the "early choices are especially crucial".⁶

Strategic and International Studies (PSIS) of the Graduate Institute of International Studies. A concluding conference was held in Stockholm (3 October 1996) to present the final report.

4 A Future Security Agenda for Europe. Report of the Independent Working Group, established by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), published in October 1996, reprinted in this volume, pp. 497-512.

5 In addition, the text of the Report was published in several journals (in English, Czech, Dutch, German, Polish and Russian) in Europe and the USA. See, for example, *The Helsinki Monitor* 6/1996; *European Security* 1/1997; *International Affairs* 1/1997 (in Russian and English); *Berliner Europa Forum* 1/1997 (in German); *Mezhdunarodni Vztahy* 1/1997 (in Czech); and *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* 1/1997 (in Polish and English).

6 H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York 1994, pp. 26-27.

The IWG was accordingly given a mandate broader than the one for the OSCE Security Model, as formulated in the decisions taken at the December 1995 Ministerial Council Meeting in Budapest.⁷ The aims of the IWG were defined as follows:

- to assess the principal changes under way in the European security environment;
- to identify new risks and challenges and ways and means to meet them;
- to define the goals of the emerging security system and to elaborate its guiding principles; and
- to suggest reforms of existing institutions to enable them to cope with and manage the fundamental changes under way in Europe.

A key concern in setting these aims was for the IWG to move beyond a discussion of the changing roles and structures of multilateral organizations in Europe. Given the intensity of the debates now raging over the enlargement of NATO and the European Union and their future roles in the security sphere, it is perhaps not surprising that an "architectural approach" (i.e., one focused upon the structure and interaction of multilateral organizations) dominates much of the current discussion about how the European security system will look and function in the future. However, the assumption underlying the work of the IWG was that security organizations should follow the problems - not the other way around. Accordingly, the approach guiding the work of the IWG was to first identify and examine the main security challenges and risks facing Europe today and in the foreseeable future and then ask what normative changes in existing institutions are needed to address them; consideration of the structure and function of multilateral organizations followed therefrom.⁸ In this regard, the task at hand was not about "constructing buildings" but rather about "building constructs".

Towards a Co-operative Security System

The end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the bipolar division of Europe have led to considerable ferment among researchers and diplomats in thinking about ways to build a new European security system for a new era.

7 Fifth Meeting of the Council, Budapest, December 1995, Chairman's Summary of the Fifth Meeting of the Council of Ministers, 7-8 December 1995, Budapest, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 2), pp. 215-228.

8 Borrowing from regime theory in the political science literature, "institutions" are understood here in a broad sense, as "sets of practices and expectations rather than (...) formal organizations with imposing headquarters buildings". R. Keohane, *After Hegemony* Princeton, New Jersey, 1984, pp. 246-47.

In establishing this project, SIPRI proceeded from the view that co-operative security - as the organizing principle of a system "that seeks to accomplish its purposes through institutionalized consent rather than through threats of material or physical coercion"⁹ - is both a viable and desirable basis for preserving peace and stability in the post-Cold War world.

A system of co-operative security implies states' acceptance of, and compliance with, an overlapping series of binding commitments limiting military capabilities and actions. Instead of mistrust, deterrence and enforcement, a co-operative security regime is one in which relations among states rest on mutual confidence, derived from transparency and predictability; reassurance and avoidance of tension; and legitimacy, which depends on the acceptance by states that the military constraints of the regime in fact substantially ensure their security. Within such a regime both the incentives and capabilities for states to wage war are dramatically reduced.

The move towards a system of co-operative security requires a transformation of the basis of security. The foundation of security during the Cold War was mutual *deterrence*, which reflected the systemic imperative of preventing the political differences at the core of the East-West rivalry from escalating into a potentially catastrophic armed conflict. Peace rested on prudent restraint and the recognition of the two opposing blocs of the perils of the nuclear age; the role of arms control was to remove potentially destabilizing asymmetries of military capabilities between the blocs and reduce mutual uncertainty and tension through confidence-building measures.

The foundation of a new system of co-operative security in Europe should be mutual *reassurance*, which requires states to co-operate intimately with erstwhile adversaries in traditionally sensitive military matters. Indeed, this is the essence of co-operative security: it "requires an ability to initiate and maintain cooperation among sovereign states on matters that have been traditionally conceived of as the heart of sovereignty: decisions about what is needed to maintain and preserve national security".¹⁰

The difficulty in building such a system has been likened to "a boat that will have to be built while it is sailing". It will not emerge as the product of a coherent, overall design. Rather, it will emerge as a result of diverse, sometimes contradictory practical expediences, and will be contingent upon a process

9 J.E. Nolan *et al.*, The Concept of Cooperative Security, in: J.E. Nolan (Ed.), *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century*, Washington DC, 1994, pp. 3-18, p. 4. See also A.D. Rotfeld, Europe: the multilateral security process, in: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *SIPRI Yearbook 1995*, Oxford, 1995, pp. 265-314; A.D. Rotfeld, Europe: towards new security arrangements, in: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *SIPRI Yearbook 1996*, Oxford, 1996, pp. 279-322; and A.D. Rotfeld, Europe: in search of co-operative security, in: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *SIPRI Yearbook*, Oxford, 1997, pp. 127-162.

10 A. Handler Chayes/A. Chayes., Regime Architecture: Elements and Principles, in: Nolan (Ed.), cited above (note 9), p. 65-130, p. 65.

of trial and error endeavours rather than on the implementation of a logically-consistent set of theoretical propositions.

The basic elements of a co-operative security order have been in place in Europe for nearly a decade. These include: limitations on offensive military capabilities, operational confidence-building measures, co-operative transparency and verification regimes, and multilateral arrangements for controlling the export of military-related equipment and critical technologies. As one American scholar has observed, "Europe is by every measure the best test bed for cooperative security. In no other region has there been more progress toward mutual regulation of military capabilities and operations, toward mutual reassurance and the avoidance of tension (...)"¹¹

This overlapping network of arms control and confidence-building measures has contributed to creating an unprecedented - some have ventured to say, revolutionary - core of military stability and predictability in Europe.¹² It has done this in two principle ways. First, it has promoted the restructuring of national armed forces so as to make them more useful for self-defence than for attack; "defensive defence" postures are now the status quo in Europe and make the military balance considerably more stable and less threatening than in the past. Second, it forms the foundation of a comprehensive transparency and verification regime that allows all states to know the holdings and disposition of other states' armed forces, thereby reducing security dilemma anxieties.¹³ Together these measures essentially constitute a confidence-building measure writ large, one that underpins politico-military relations within the whole community of states stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

The OSCE was instrumental in bringing to fruition many of these Cold War-era arms limitation and confidence-building arrangements, which today are treated as norms governing relations between states and shaping expectations about their behaviour. Indeed, it is difficult to overestimate the role of the Helsinki process in this regard. Along with facilitating the spread across Europe of a system of shared values based on democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law, the OSCE provided a framework for negotiating overlapping and reinforcing arms control arrangements that are forging a new European reality in which the prospect of the use of force in interstate relations seems ever more remote.

However, the accomplishments to date leave no room for complacency; much is left to be done in the arms control field if the promise of co-opera-

11 C. Kelleher, *Cooperative Security in Europe*, in: Nolan (Ed.), cited above (note 9), pp. 293-354, p. 293.

12 M. Mandelbaum, *The Dawn of Peace in Europe*, New York, 1996, pp. 67-110.

13 The "security dilemma" describes a situation in which the defensive preparations by one state may appear to benignly inclined neighbours as evidence of aggressive intent. These preparations can trigger unexpected actions by the neighbours that also have defensive motives but nonetheless appear hostile.

tive security is to be fulfilled. For example, the regime based on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) remains unfinished business.¹⁴ The record of states' compliance with the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, although improving, is still less than perfect. In addition, the break-up of the former Soviet Union has given a new dimension to the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that requires urgent attention.

More important, the substance of security problems in Europe has changed. The challenges facing policy makers at the end of this decade are fundamentally different from those at the end of the previous decade, as are the priorities and hierarchy of outstanding issues. In particular, at a time when the danger of a major war *between* states is now very low, conflicts *within* states have emerged as the principle threat to peace and security in Europe. The latter have changed in character and grown in intensity. As documented in recent SIPRI Yearbooks, for example, almost all of the major armed conflicts between 1992-97 were of an intrastate character, and most were waged by internal parties for control of the government or territory of a state.¹⁵

This development reflects the fundamental change in the global geopolitical situation since 1989. During the Cold War both superpowers saw all conflicts within their respective spheres as affecting their vital interests. With the abrupt end of the period of East-West political and ideological confrontation, however, many local conflicts which were considered to be unacceptable (because of the danger that they could inadvertently touch off a major conflagration) became, in a sense, "acceptable". The result has been a proliferation of local armed conflicts erupting from latent tensions and animosities that were suppressed during the Cold War.

Since the nature of threats to peace and stability has changes radically, the concepts and instruments for addressing them must also change. In particular, it is essential that the "rules of the game" in an emerging cooperative security system be broadened from the traditional focus on the security of states to include the security of people. This requires a reinterpretation or redefinition of key rules and principles in order to form a new normative basis for shaping expectations about the domestic as well as the international behaviour of states. This, in turn, entails normative constraints on sovereignty and non-intervention, which since the time of Grotius have been treated as the cornerstones of international law. Ultimately, it is the acceptance by states of

14 For a review of recent CFE Treaty-related developments and the Treaty regime's future agenda, see Z. Lachowski, Conventional arms control, in: SIPRI Yearbook 1997, cited above (Note 9), pp. 471-484.

15 In 1996 there were 27 major armed conflicts world-wide (compared to 30 in 1995). All but one of these conflicts (that between India and Pakistan over Kashmir) were domestic in nature; none of the conflicts within the OSCE area was of an interstate character. See M. Sollenberg/P. Wallensteen, Major armed conflicts, in: *ibid.*, pp. 17-30.

these constraints which lies at an heart of an emerging co-operative security order.

Risks and Challenges

A wide range of views were expressed in the IWG meetings that reflected differing and sometimes rival perspectives on the central security challenges and tasks confronting Europe as it approaches the next century. However, a general consensus among the participants emerged on several points about the new nature of these risks and challenges in the post-Cold War world.

First, the non-military dimensions of security are becoming more important with the end of the period of bipolar confrontation and require a broader understanding of security. The new issues demanding urgent attention include civil wars, ethnic and national conflicts as well as environmental degradation, organized crime, terrorism, and large-scale population movements. However, as one participant observed, this gives rise to a "problem of quantity" in that it becomes possible to compile an almost endless list of potential or actual security risks and challenges demanding attention; indeed, "security" begins to lose its meaning as a concept.¹⁶ Therefore, a key task is to determine which of the identified risks and challenges are of a root character and which are derivative in nature, which are long-term and basic and which are transitional. Otherwise, it becomes impossible to prioritize responses for meeting them.

Second, the most serious security risks emerging in post-Cold War Europe stem from intrastate conflicts (which may have important external dimensions) rather than from interstate conflicts. Many of these risks are rooted in the fundamental changes under way in the former communist states and involve:

- the social dislocations arising from the transition from centrally-planned to market economies;
- the political instabilities connected with the transition from one-party totalitarian states to pluralistic democracies based upon the rule of law; and
- the resurfacing of long-suppressed religious, linguistic and ethnic conflicts.

Of special concern are the formidable political, economic and social problems facing the newly-independent states that have emerged out of the collapse of the old Soviet and Yugoslav multinational federations. The problems

¹⁶ Piotr Switalski, former Head of the Department for Chairman-in-Office Support at the OSCE Secretariat, at the Budapest meeting of the IWG, 1 December 1995.

connected with consolidating independence and building new states are particularly acute here because there has been little prior state-building in these countries.

Third, despite the disappearance of the old East-West divide, Europe today remains divided by large social and economic gulfs that threaten to become permanent features of the political landscape. One of the key challenges of the next century is to prevent the fragmentation of security in Europe and the subsequent renationalization of security policies, a development that is already inchoately visible. In this connection there is a pressing need to promote co-operative initiatives at the sub-regional level, which can help to forestall a permanent division of the continent.

In addition to these qualitatively new challenges, a number of participants argued that the "classic threats" associated with armed interstate conflict still figure prominently in the European security equation. The mistrust between neighbouring states fuelled by conflicts over borders, natural resources, the treatment of ethnic kin residing abroad, etc., can give rise to security dilemma anxieties and lead to destabilizing arms races that adversely affect the security environment. The maintenance of military-strategic stability therefore remains an important goal - one that requires a renewed emphasis on arms reduction and confidence-building measures (e.g. the CFE Treaty, Open Skies Treaty, OSCE Code of Conduct), which are in danger of being eroded. It also requires the development of effective strategies and mechanisms for crisis management and conflict prevention.

Many of the participants singled out the constructive integration of Russia into the new European security system as posing one of the most crucial challenges for a future security model. Several argued that the real "Russian threat" comes from the fact that its myriad instabilities can spill over across its borders and undermine the European order; in this regard, Russia has great potential to play a spoiling role.

Finally, although the purpose in convening the IWG was to discuss the future security agenda for Europe, the Group was cautioned against adopting an unduly Eurocentric focus. There are a host of ethnic, environmental, population and other developmental problems in what one participant referred to as Europe's "near abroad" - North Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East - that are genuine sources of tension and potential security problems for Europe.¹⁷ Europeans must consider what can be done to create a better dialogue with the countries of these regions; in particular, there is a need to engage the Islamic political forces in these countries.

17 John Maresca, former Head of the US Delegation to the CSCE, at the Moscow meeting of the IWG, 12-13 April 1996.

Adapting Principles and Norms

What should be the basic principles and rules underlying the evolving post-Cold War European security system? Again, the discussions at the IWG meetings brought out a wide range of views and sometimes conflicting perspectives.

At the broadest level, one participant argued that security should be conceived of as a means to an end, namely, that of self-realization of internal goals and ideals (democratization, development of market economies, etc.). She suggested three basic principles which should be included in a security model:

- each state is sovereign and must be responsible for its own security, even if it belongs to a military alliance;
- security problems should be addressed on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity (that is, decisions and actions should be carried out at the lowest level at which they can be effectively taken); and
- there must be solidarity and non-contradiction between states with regard to security issues.

She also suggested developing a principle, adapted from the arms control literature, of "sufficiency of security". Admittedly, this would be a subjective, difficult-to-quantify principle; however, the security perceptions of states are themselves highly subjective.¹⁸

It was also suggested that a principle of *inclusion* should be incorporated into a future security system.¹⁹ This principle means that all states would be welcomed into the community of European nations, at least to the extent that they are willing to abide by prevailing norms. It would seek to forestall the drawing of new lines of division in Europe. The emergence of such fault lines in the political landscape would not only promote a renationalization of security policies, but - perhaps even more worrying - could foster the return of a bloc mentality. It was seen as being particularly important in this regard to constructively integrate Russia into the post-Cold War security order and to promote Russia's acceptance of the legitimacy of that order.

NATO's plan to enlarge its membership to include former Warsaw Pact allies in Central and Eastern Europe provoked differing reactions from the Group. While a number of participants criticized NATO enlargement because it would, *inter alia*, violate a principle of inclusion, others viewed it

18 Alyson J. K. Bailes, former Head of the Security Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, at the Geneva meeting of the IWG, 23-24 May 1996.

19 John Maresca, at the Geneva meeting of the IWG, 23-24 May 1996.

as being one of the components of a long-term and multi-faceted security-building process in Europe. This process will include the internal transformation and enlargement of virtually all the existing multilateral security organizations in Europe - not only NATO, but also the EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. This should be seen a natural process, one that can provide credible safeguards for Russia's legitimate security interests and give Russia a responsible role in managing the European security order. Viewed from a long-term perspective, there is no contradiction between the "deepening" and "widening" of European security organizations; the two processes are in fact complementary.

There was general agreement among the IWG participants that a future security regime should be based upon a shared set of norms that create rules and procedures guiding the domestic as well as the international behaviour of states within the European security system. A prerequisite for creating this normative basis for state behaviour is the establishment of a common understanding of the fundamental goals and principles of that system. However, it was noted that while there is a clear need for a shared "rule book" shaping expectations about state action, what is conspicuously lacking are basic rules. Many of the participants cautioned that the rules for a future security order cannot be confined to general political declarations of security principles, such as those set out in the 1994 Budapest Summit Declaration. Adjectives such as "common" and "comprehensive" and "co-operative" were criticized for lacking conceptual clarity and for being open to widely differing interpretation. It was argued that this terminology, which abounds in diplomatic documents, is perhaps better understood as establishing criteria which the new security system should meet rather than as its guiding principles.

Similarly, considerable dissatisfaction was expressed with some of the now-familiar postulates that have arisen from recent work within the OSCE on developing a Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-first Century. One of the inconvenient issues that the IWG addressed was what one participant described as the "fallacy" of the homogeneity of European security. He argued that security in Europe is in fact non-homogenous in nature: it varies between countries not only in terms of the existence of security guarantees but also in terms of their perceptions of the key challenges facing them.²⁰ Hence, terms such as "common security space" are misleading, since this space actually consists of different areas or layered zones of security.

With regard to the related notion of the indivisibility of security, the view was expressed that peace and security are in fact divisible; they are bound up within geopolitical boundaries. This has made it increasingly difficult to rally domestic support in stable and prosperous states for decisive action to solve

20 John Roper, Royal Institute of International Affairs, at the Geneva meeting of the IWG, 23-24 May 1996.

distant security problems.²¹ One participant suggested that the concept of the indivisibility of security should be regarded as an axiom in a future security model rather than as a description of the actual state of affairs in Europe. While it may be unrealistic to expect that genuinely equal security can ever be achieved, the aim should be to reduce existing inequalities as much as possible. In this sense, the indivisibility of security should be seen as a goal for a future security system.²²

There was a consensus among the participants against systematically replacing or re-writing the principles and norms codified in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Indeed, there is no need to do so since the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe has a quite different philosophical focus, *viz.*, one that is not exclusively focused on relations between states but rather on relations within them. The prevailing opinion was that it is essential to re-affirm the Final Act principles. Despite their internal inconsistencies, they represent a signal achievement of enduring value.

However, there was general agreement that the redefinition or reinterpretation of key principles should be considered in light of the fundamental changes that have taken place in Europe. It was pointed out that the principles that have been agreed and adopted in various CSCE/OSCE documents over the last 20 years sum up the successive stages of Europe's contemporary history and at the same time map out the lines for the further development of mutual relations. In this sense, the provisions from Helsinki, Paris, Budapest and Lisbon are chapters in the security-building process. The process itself is still unfolding, *in statu nascendi*. It would be ignoring the new European reality if the content of some of these provisions and their interrelationships were not examined anew.²³

In particular, it was agreed that there is a need to redefine the interrelationship of such principles as sovereignty, the equal rights of states and non-intervention, on the one hand, and the right of the international community to intervene, on the other - either when state authorities perpetrate acts of violence against their own societies or when they can no longer ensure security to populations who are deprived of basic rights and are being killed in conflicts formerly treated as being essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. The interrelationship between these existing principles needs to be re-examined in light of a new principle - that of *solidarity*, as reflected in the

21 Peter Volten, Director, Centre for European Studies, University of Groningen, at the Budapest meeting of the IWG, 1 December 1995.

22 Alexander Smolar, President, Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw, at the Geneva meeting of the IWG, 23-24 May 1996.

23 A.D. Rotfeld, Presentation of the Work of the Independent Working Group at the OSCE Security Model Committee, Vienna, 28 June 1996.

1994 Code of Conduct.²⁴ This new principle is incompatible with a strict interpretation of Principle VI of the Helsinki Final Act (that is, non-intervention in internal affairs). Several participants pointed out that the OSCE already has the competence to intervene in the affairs of participating States to pre-empt or attenuate crises or to reconstruct war-torn states. The establishment of what might be called a right of "co-operative intervention" would extend this competence and vitally supplement the Final Act principles.

A second key interrelationship which needs to be redefined is that between the right of self-determination and the principle of state integrity.²⁵ Self-determination has become one of the pillars of international law - one that is crucial for promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. One possibility that was raised for implementing this principle in the context of state integrity would be to prohibit the use of force against national minority groups advocating peaceful change. Another possibility would be to prohibit the use of armed forces in carrying out internal border and population changes.²⁶

At the same time, many participants acknowledged that the right of self-determination cannot be identified exclusively with the right to secession or the right to independent statehood. It must be realized within a wide range of various forms of autonomy; the right to self-determination must be balanced by the right to state integrity with safe and secure borders. One participant suggested that the OSCE needs interpretative statements of principles such as territorial integrity and the right to self-determination, which states have been very reluctant to make. It is important to say in an interpretative way, for example, that the right to self-determination is not a right to secession.²⁷ However, another participant argued that a certain degree of ambiguity between the principles of state integrity and the right to self-determination should be maintained; for practical diplomatic and humanitarian reasons, the international community should "never say never" with respect to secession.²⁸

Finally, the point was made that the failure of states to implement agreed-upon principles and respect their binding commitments needs to be addressed in the future European security system. This problem cannot be solved by the creation of additional legal mechanisms; the OSCE should therefore explore other possibilities for ensuring compliance. In particular, it was suggested

24 A.D. Rotfeld, In search of a common, co-operative and comprehensive security model for Europe, Background Paper to the first meeting of the Independent Working Group, November 1995.

25 Cf. *ibid.*

26 Victor-Yves Ghebali, Professor, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, at the Geneva meeting of the IWG, 23-24 May 1996.

27 Wilhelm Höynck, former Secretary General of the OSCE, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva, Switzerland, at the Geneva meeting of the IWG, 23-24 May 1996.

28 Edouard Brunner, former Head of the Swiss Delegation to the CSCE, Ambassador of Switzerland to France, at the Geneva meeting of the IWG, 23-24 May 1996.

that the roles of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and parliamentarians should be re-examined in this connection.

Adapting Security Organizations

Much of the discussion in the meetings focused on the changing structures and roles of existing organizations in the new security system. A number of participants expressed their dislike of the widespread use of the terms "architecture" and "model" in the ongoing debate about that system. These terms were criticized for being too static and for failing to capture the dynamic aspects of security interactions.

There was a general consensus that the basic organizational elements of the post-Cold War security system emerging in Europe are already in place, although they are arranged in a messy and overlapping fashion. These elements were described by one participant as consisting of (in non-hierarchical order):

- the enlarging Euro-Atlantic organizations;
- the evolving arrangements between NATO and non-NATO members;
- the OSCE;
- regional and sub-regional co-operation; and
- bilateral relations between states.

Euro-Atlantic Organizations and Russia

With regard to specific multilateral organizations, a number of participants argued that NATO and the EU are in fact already the two principle structures of the post-Cold War security system. The key challenge now is to carry out the enlargement of these organizations in a co-operative, non-confrontational way that does not foment new antagonisms and divisions. It was stressed in the meetings that a compromise needs to be reached with Russia that will reassure it that its interests are considered and that it remains an important international actor. In the absence of constructive solutions, there is a serious danger that Russia will operate with a narrow, self-centred view of its own security and not take account of the interests of other states.

In this connection, it was suggested that with regard to the enlargement of NATO, Russia should concentrate on developing a strategic partnership between itself and the Alliance. The special relations may be based on the 1949 Washington Treaty provisions adapted to the realities of Russia's and NATO's specific functions and roles. Also suggested was the institutionalization of direct military-to-military co-operation in order to foster a gradual

accommodation that could form the basis for a comprehensive political structure over the long term. NATO and Russia should undertake direct negotiations on those issues where common ground can be found.

Several participants supported the establishment of a formal institutional bridge linking NATO and Russia - one that would not be dependent upon personalities or the outcomes of elections. This formal structure was seen as promoting a deeper dialogue in which Russia would find both respect and a hearing for its interests and as becoming the *de facto* foundation for the security order for the next century.

In this regard, however, concern was expressed that an institutionalization of the NATO-Russia relationship might raise fears of condominium among the non-NATO countries (e.g., Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states) in the region. Furthermore, unless this forum were confined solely to European issues - by no means an easy task, given the multi-dimensional character of many security issues - it might mark the beginning of the globalization of NATO.

European Executive Body

The idea of creating a kind of European Security Council that would be vested with executive powers for implementing decisions taken by consensus received little support from the Group. The participants from smaller states were particularly opposed to this idea, arguing that the creation of a European executive organ would likely result in their exclusion from the discussion of issues that directly affect them. It was pointed out that a deterioration in relations with Russia, for example, would first and foremost impact upon small states like Finland, the Baltic states and others.

OSCE

It was generally agreed that the OSCE is structurally incapable of serving as the primary security organization of a future European security system. However, this does not mean that the OSCE cannot make a significant contribution to the emerging security system. It already provides an opportunity for a focused dialogue, transparency and information exchanges between states that can serve to reassure governments. In addition, promising OSCE instruments, such as the High Commissioner on National Minorities, should be developed further and perhaps emulated elsewhere.

It was pointed out that the OSCE's extensive mandate and tasks are clearly disproportionate to its limited means. However, the OSCE has made effective use of its modest budget and should not become excessively bureaucratized (such as by creating a host of new institutions). It was suggested that the or-

ganization rely instead on *ad hoc* bodies, which have so far proven to be the most effective approach to implementing its declared goals. In particular, it was suggested to consolidate and strengthen the roles of the Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary General, who may function as a steering committee, rather than to create a formal bureaucratic structure.

New Rules

Three additional issues were raised in connection with the discussion of multilateral organizations:

- enforcement of rules: if some form of European Security Council cannot be created, then how will the "rules" underlying the system be enforced?
- enfranchisement: what can be done in the OSCE model to reassure those states which are disenfranchised from rule-based collective security organizations? If nothing is done, does this task fall to NATO?
- erosion of state actors: a security organization which does not have procedures for dealing with non-state actors who can use coercive force is out of touch with a key trend of the late 20th century - namely, the state's loss of its monopoly of the instruments of force.

Transatlantic Dimension

Several participants warned that with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet military power, the USA is gradually drifting away from Europe. As the war in former Yugoslavia has amply illustrated, however, the USA still has a crucial role to play in Europe and there is a corresponding need to keep it engaged in the defence and security affairs of the continent.

Conclusions

One of the conclusions of the IWG Report was that NATO should "enter into a dialogue about security-related issues with Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic states". The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation (Paris, 27 May 1997) and the decisions taken at the NATO Summit Meeting in Madrid (8-9 July 1997) demonstrate the practical application of the principles of co-operation and inclusion, as proposed in the IWG Report.

It is clear that no single security organization - whether NATO, the EU, the OSCE or the Council of Europe - will be able to manage alone the European security process. In spite of numerous agreements, the existing security or-

ganizations in Europe continue to operate in a poorly co-ordinated way and duplicate each other's functions. As suggested in the Report, the focus of the work on a future security model should therefore be more on the content of the co-operation between security-related organizations rather than on their structures and procedures.

Ultimately, the process of building security in Europe must be based on common values as well as on overlapping networks of security co-operation that can help prevent conflicts and find solutions to both shared and individual security problems. The 1996 Lisbon Declaration identified the common values for building a new co-operative security system in Europe. These consist of respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, the development of market economies and the pursuit of social justice. They also include mutual confidence and the peaceful settlement of disputes, and exclude any quest for domination.

The new political commitments undertaken in the Lisbon Security Model Declaration can be summarized as follows: to "act in solidarity" in order to promote full implementation of the principles and norms codified in the basic OSCE documents; to "consult promptly (...) with a participating State whose security is threatened" and to "consider jointly actions that may have to be undertaken in defence of our common values"; not to support those who are acting "in violation of international law against the territorial integrity or political independence of any participating State", and to attach importance to the security of all participating States, "irrespective of whether they belong to military structures or arrangements".²⁹ The commitments to *act in solidarity* and *consider jointly actions* constitute a positive response to the proposal contained in the Independent Working Group's Report and addressed to the OSCE, to define new principles of solidarity and the right to "co-operative intervention". In this regard, the Heads of State or Government recommended to their representatives that their ongoing work on a Security Model should be focused, among other points, on enhancing instruments of joint co-operative action in the event of non-compliance with OSCE commitments.

29 Lisbon Document 1996, reprinted in this volume, pp. 419-446. See here Lisbon Summit Declaration, pp. 420-425, and Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 426-430.