

Japan and the OSCE

Japan's Institutional Status in the CSCE/OSCE

Since the Helsinki Summit Meeting in July 1992, Japan has participated in various CSCE/OSCE meetings and activities. Japan has had better access to them than any other non-participating State for the following reasons: first, its shared values with the OSCE principles, second, its role as a "soft-security provider" in the OSCE region through its significant contributions to stability there, third, its direct legitimate security interests in the OSCE since Japan is in an adjacent area.

The Helsinki Summit Declaration - the first part of the Helsinki Document - includes the following paragraph on non-participating States: "We have expanded dialogue with non-participating States, inviting them to take part in our activities on a selective basis when they can make a contribution."¹ The second part of the Summit Document, the "Helsinki Decisions", defines the details of its relations with Japan, which establishes a permanent institutionalized place: "In accordance with paragraph 45 of the Prague Document, the participating States intend to deepen their co-operation and develop a substantial relationship with non-participating States, such as Japan, which display an interest in the CSCE, share its principles and objectives, and are actively engaged in European co-operation through relevant organizations. To this end, Japan will be invited to attend CSCE meetings, including those of Heads of State and Government, the CSCE Council, the Committee of Senior Officials and other appropriate CSCE bodies which consider specific topics of expanded consultation and co-operation. Representatives of Japan may contribute to such meetings, without participating in the preparation and adoption of decisions, on subjects in which Japan has a direct interest and/or wishes to co-operate actively with the CSCE."²

Since the institutional change of the CSCE, Japan has been invited to participate in various meetings including the Senior Council, the Permanent Council, the Forum for Security Co-operation as well as Summit meetings, review meetings, preparatory meetings, the Ministerial Councils and to seminar activities. The decision adopted in Helsinki does not prohibit Japan from observing and following the drafting process since Japan cannot defend its vital

1 CSCE Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, in: Arie Bloed (Ed.), *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993*, Dordrecht/Boston/London, pp. 701-777, here p. 709.

2 *Ibid.*, pp. 731-732.

interests and cannot contribute to the OSCE without any information. The decision enables Japan to express its views by contribution. For this reason, Japan has followed the formal drafting process in the working groups or drafting groups and the committee of Summit and other meetings, including Ministerial Councils and the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) or the Senior Council.

With regard to the drafting process of the "Japan formula" of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, the paragraph was based on a wording agreed to by the United States and the United Kingdom on 6 July 1992. In late June, the US had proposed a new category of "associate membership". The United States was strongly in favour of finding a formula which would enable Japan to participate in the CSCE without diluting CSCE cohesiveness by inviting an unlimited number of countries from the non-CSCE area. For that reason, the US proposed introducing the criteria for membership in the OECD as well as other appropriate criteria to limit the candidates for a closer relationship.

The US proposed that Japan participate in CSCE meetings including the Summits and the meetings of the Ministerial Council at the level of Foreign Minister or lower with the right to speak; the meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials (now the Senior Council) at the level of senior official whom the Chairman may invite to speak; the follow-up meetings including formal plenary and working group sessions, at the level of senior officials or lower, with the right to participate in discussions; in the work of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) at the level of senior official or lower whom the Chairman may invite to speak. The US proposal explained the reason why Japan should be invited to participate and should have the right to speak: Japan's purpose in formalizing its relationship to the CSCE is to provide information and have its voice heard on CSCE issues affecting relations with Japan. Japan's participation is limited to the discussion of issues and it does not include taking part in the decision-making.

The EC member-countries submitted proposals on CSCE relations with non-participating States. The EC's first draft, dated 6 May 1992, set forth a new status for Japan which is different from the non-participating Mediterranean States as defined in the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 1973. In this regard, the US and the EC countries had the same approach. The EC's first draft reads as follows: "(Non-participating States which) share ideals, standards and objectives of the CSCE, including respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law, have shown an interest in a close, permanent dialogue with CSCE participating States, in particular through common membership in relevant institutions and organizations, and are adjacent to the CSCE geographical area." Under this proposal, Japan could be invited on an *ad hoc* basis to make

contributions to future activities, including follow-up meetings and other meetings. It established a channel for regular information exchange through the Chairman-in-Office of the Council or the CSO, as well as the CSCE institutions and Japan, which would ensure "a timely notification of official CSCE documents and exchange of other relevant documentation".³

The difference between the Japanese idea and the EC proposal was that the latter provided for Japanese participation on an *ad hoc* and invitational basis, while the US idea secured permanent Japanese participation. The revised EC proposal amended this point as follows: "The said States could be invited to be present as special guests at Summit Meetings and Council Meetings and in this capacity to make contributions, as appropriate, to future CSCE activities, including Follow-up Meetings and specialized fora within the framework of the CSO."⁴

The final outcome of this negotiation, which was cited above, created a new status for Japan, which was different from the non-participating Mediterranean States. The CSCE idea of having deepening and widening relations with non-participating States can be traced back to the Paris Charter of 1990, whose section, "The CSCE and the World" expressed the view that "(w)e stand ready to join with any and all States in common efforts to protect and advance the community of fundamental human values".⁵ The Berlin Council Meeting in June 1991 attached importance to being "open to dialogue and co-operation with the rest of the world and noted the interest of other countries"⁶ and requested the CSO to report to a future Council meeting. In the Berlin Council, the Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Gianni de Michelis, submitted a proposal to involve Japan in the CSCE.⁷ In late October 1991, Italy circulated a proposal in the CSO for establishing a dialogue with Japan. The Prague Council Meeting at the end of January 1992 concluded by requesting the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to "recommend practical ways to establish a flexible dialogue (...)"⁸ Establishing dialogue with Japan was strongly supported by many countries: it was expressed by Czech President Havel's statement to the Prague Council⁹ and was made clear by many

3 CSCE/HM/WG1/6.

4 CSCE/HM/WG/6/Rev.1

5 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 21 November 1990, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 1), pp. 537-566, here p. 542.

6 First Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/Ministerial Council, Berlin, 19-20 June 1991, Final document (paragraph 19), in: <http://www.osceprag.cz/docs/mc-berlin/finaldoc/english/1ber191e>.

7 For further details, see Takako Ueta, Japan and the CSCE, in: Michael Lucas (Ed.), *The CSCE in the 1990s*, Baden-Baden 1993, pp. 209-212.

8 Prague Meeting of the CSCE Council, 30-31 January 1992, Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 1), pp. 830-837, here p. 837.

9 Cf. statement by H.E. Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Slovak Federal Republic at the Second Meeting of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the CSCE, Prague, 30 January 1992.

statesmen including German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, US Secretary of State James Baker, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock during intensive bilateral consultations with Japan from February to April in 1992.

Japan's Interest in the OSCE

Setting up a direct link between the OSCE and Japan is a part of Japan's strategy to strengthening ties with Europe and European and trans-Atlantic institutions after the end of the East-West military confrontation in Europe. During the Cold War era, Japan was not involved in political and security consultations on Europe except for being a member of the G-7, while in the 1920s Japan participated in various activities on peaceful settlement of disputes such as the Upper Silesian question as a Permanent Council Member of the League of Nations.

After the drastic change in Europe in 1989, Japan was asked to contribute to the reform and reconstruction in Central and Eastern Europe, the former USSR and former Yugoslavia as a member of the G-7. Japan has contributed to this reconstruction process by way of the G-24, the OECD, the EBRD and bilateral co-operation. In order to contribute to it, Japan needed to be familiar with the situation on the spot and to be involved in political consultation.

The second reason is that Japan has legitimate security interests in the OSCE area since Japan is located in an adjacent region. Any framework of arms control including Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) and any regional conflicts in Japan's neighbouring region in the OSCE might affect Japan's security interests. The zone of application of the CSBMs is one example. According to the *East Asian Strategic Review*, published by the National Institute for Defense Studies, items of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) in the framework of the CFE Treaty have been transferred east of the Urals, which has resulted in the modernization of the Russian Forces in the Far East.¹⁰

The growing importance of Europe and European countries on the international political scene has resulted in enhancing dialogue between Japan and Europe. After 1989, Japan strengthened its dialogue with the EC by launching the Hague Declaration (Joint Declaration on Relations between the EC and its Member States and Japan).¹¹ Besides enhancing bilateral ties with European countries, the Hague Declaration set up and strengthened a structured consultation framework including an annual summit meeting between

10 The National Institute for Defense Studies, *East Asian Strategic Review 1996-1997*, Tokyo 1997, pp. 129-130 (in Japanese).

11 Joint Declaration on Relations between Japan and the European Community and its Member States, 18 July 1991.

the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the Prime Minister of Japan, and further established a wider range of co-operation. NATO and Japan have organized seminars including participation by scholars every other year since 1990, and senior officials' consultations every other year. As for the Council of Europe, Japan obtained observer status which enabled Japan to participate in various meetings at an expert level in a comprehensive way.

In terms of security, Japan has had bilateral politico-military talks with the UK since November 1990, with Germany since June 1994, and with France since June 1994. In 1996, besides the Joint Press Statement of the fifth Japan-EU summit meeting in September in Tokyo, three documents on partnership were launched: "Action Agenda for the Japanese-German Partnership" in May; "UK/Japan Action Agenda: Special Partnership around the World" in September; "France-Japan 20 Actions for the Year 2000" in November. These documents identify concrete areas for joint co-operation. The document between France and Japan was issued on the occasion of the official visit of the French President, Mr. Chirac, and it set up more regular and intense consultation such as a summit meeting at least once a year, foreign minister meetings twice a year, and meetings of directors of the two foreign ministries twice a year for the purpose of political consultations in particular on Asia, Russia, the Middle East and Africa, the UN and disarmament.

In this document, France welcomes Japan's interest in the OSCE and undertakes to support Japan's increasing role in the OSCE.¹² As for the UK document, "(t)he British Government recognises the important contribution Japan can make to stability in Europe, including Bosnia and Ukraine, and supports Japan's wish to be fully involved in appropriate European security fora". It is stated that from the beginning, the UK government supported the Japanese participation in the CSCE.¹³

The OSCE is the only forum in which Japan has had direct day-to-day access to information on European security. The structured dialogues with the EU or major European countries do not offer daily information which is indispensable to Japan's decision-making on contribution to the Central and Eastern European countries, the New Independent States (NIS) or Bosnia. For Japan, participation in the OSCE is not a question of prestige. Japan has never shared a common approach to the OSCE with South Korea. South Korea has repeatedly explained that they wanted to learn the OSCE experiences for the purpose of applying it to the Korean Peninsula. Japan has never taken this model-approach. The reason Japan asked to set up institutionalized dialogue with the CSCE was its need to be directly involved in the political process in Europe.

12 France-Japon 20 Actions pour l'An 2000, Tokyo, le 18 novembre 1996.

13 UK/Japan Action Agenda: Special Partnership around the World, 2 September 1996.

Japan as a "Soft Security Provider" to the OSCE Area

Japan is a *de facto* soft security provider to the OSCE area, which means that Japan's various non-military contributions to Central and Eastern Europe, the former USSR and former Yugoslavia provide stability there. Japan is the number one contributor among non-European and non-American powers to these countries. Japan's contribution is mainly reactive in the sense that, as an economic giant, Japan needs to contribute its fair share. It does not reflect Japan's economic interests in this region since Japanese firms are not familiar with this region and Japan's major trading partners are in the Asia-Pacific area.

Next to Germany and the US, Japan is the number three contributor to the various Russian assistance programmes on a commitment basis; it provides in total more than 4.5 billion US-Dollars which cover humanitarian assistance, technical assistance to help promote the transition to a market economy and grant aid for dismantlement of the nuclear weapons. As of January 1996, Japan had contributed 6.3 billion US-Dollars to the NIS countries on a commitment basis.

As for the Central and Eastern European countries, according to the June 1996 data, Japan has contributed around 5.7 billion US-Dollars on a commitment basis. It covers grants (around two billion US-Dollars), which include various technical assistance and food assistance, and credits (3.7 billion US-Dollars). This figure does not include the three Baltic states, to which Japan committed 200 million US-Dollars in loans and various forms of technical assistance.

Japan has regarded the peace in Yugoslavia and its post-conflict rehabilitation process as an opportunity for the international community's collective co-operation, although this conflict did not have direct security and economic implications for Japan. During the war and the peace negotiation process, until November 1995, Japan contributed about 650 million US-Dollars to the UN peacekeeping operations and about three million Dollars for the purpose of the mine clearing operation by the UNPROFOR. For the administrative costs of the peace conference and the observation mission on the border between Bosnia and the new Yugoslavia, Japan contributed one million US-Dollars. For humanitarian and refugee assistance, Japan contributed about 180 million US-Dollars until November 1995. For the purpose of preventive diplomacy, Japan contributed a grant to Macedonia, and a loan to Albania.

As for the post-conflict rehabilitation process in Bosnia, Japan pledged 500 million US-Dollars from 1996 to 1999 and in 1996, Japan provided at least 130 million US-Dollars. For the election in September 1996, Japan contributed two million US-Dollars, and one million US-Dollars for independent media support. Japan disbursed 80 million US-Dollars for the repatriation of

refugees in 1996. For the purpose of the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Japan contributed the administrative costs of the High Representative's Office (2.54 million US-Dollars) and 14.36 million US-Dollars to the UN mission.

Japan has provided two staff members to the High Representative's Office since February 1996. In the framework of the OSCE, Japan has provided seven experts to the OSCE long-term missions, the OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje and the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Japan has contributed satellite telecommunication facilities to these missions. Regarding the election in Bosnia, Japan sent 29 supervisors and five observers.

In the OSCE Economic Forum in June 1996, Japan made clear that "(r)ecognizing that stability and steady economic development is inseparable, Japan supports the OSCE's assistance for transformation into market economy of the Central and East European countries and former Soviet countries".¹⁴ For the purpose of conversion and democratization of these countries, the OSCE has organized various seminars, to which Japan has sent experts and also contributed, including the seminar on "Small and Medium Sized Enterprises" held in Kyrgyzstan in February 1994, the seminar on "Environment and Business" in Estonia in September 1994, the seminar on minorities in May 1995 in Kyrgyzstan, the seminar on "Rehabilitating the Environment" in October 1995 in Uzbekistan, and the seminar on rule of law in November 1995 in Warsaw. It has contributed more than 70 thousand US-Dollars.

Since 1995, Japan has contributed to the administrative costs of the OSCE at a rate of about 300,000 Austrian Schillings a year. In the framework of the Council of Europe, Japan has sent eleven experts to the various seminars as well as offered financial assistance to them since 1993. Japan has contributed to the programme of supporting the democratization of Ukraine since 1995.

Towards More Fruitful Co-operation

Among the "partner for co-operation" countries, Japan has been outstanding for its international responsibility, its contribution to the OSCE, its integral relations with the OSCE States as well as its direct security interests in the OSCE area. Japan also stands out by sharing the same values with the OSCE. Japan has never been a military security threat to the OSCE States. Since 1992, Japan has never jeopardized OSCE activities by introducing "out-of-area" issues which could dilute the OSCE's European focus.

Since 1994, however, the OSCE has not successfully made use of its relations with Japan, mainly because the spirit of the Helsinki Decisions of 1992 has not been fully implemented. For example, on the occasion of the

14 REF.SC/108/96, 29 March 1996, Japan and Economic Activities of the OSCE.

Budapest Summit Japan was asked to give a "written" contribution which was not satisfactory for any delegation. Even before the establishment of its institutional status, Japan was invited to contribute to the Helsinki Summit. During the Lisbon preparatory meeting, a country questioned Japan's presence at the formal drafting groups and the committee, while Japan was present during the whole formal drafting process in Budapest and on other occasions. There seems to be inconsistency, which is not helpful to co-operation. In this regard, the "linkage tactics" which aim at upgrading the status and access of the Mediterranean non-participating States at the expense of Japan's status is not constructive.

From the outset, Japan's status was different from that of other non-participating States and there are reasons to have different categories. There is no rationale in having a single category. If one country blocks Japan's participation, it does not mean that better access for other non-participating States will be assured by participating States. Better access should be achieved by consensus among the participating States and it has nothing to do with Japan's status. When one country blocks Japan's participation, it may jeopardize Japan's contribution to the OSCE, which Japan does not desire. At the present stage, to create an Asian group is not a solution since Japan and South Korea share nothing in common. In terms of the OSCE, the reason why Japan asked to set up institutional dialogue with the CSCE was its need to be involved in the political process in Europe. The two countries' interests in the OSCE were too different to justify their attending the same meeting. The dialogue between the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the OSCE is premature since no country can represent the ARF. It would be a ceremonial meeting. Instead, the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) process started in March 1996 in Bangkok. At various levels including the heads of state, EU countries, the ASEAN countries, Japan, China and South Korea assemble and exchange views on various subjects, including security issues.

More fruitful exchange and co-operation can be achieved by way of direct participation. Among the OSCE States, the US, Russia, and Canada, and the EU are full members of the ARF. Japan and South Korea, which are also full members of the ARF, have different participating status in the OSCE. Through this channel both institutions can benefit from the other's experiences. This is the way to foster co-operation.

Security is indivisible. Even if the OSCE has achieved internal security, instability in an adjacent area might affect the OSCE's security. It is also possible that the OSCE participating States' instability might affect the security of countries adjacent to them. In this regard, it would enhance stability if OSCE principles, practices and mechanisms in the area of conflict prevention and peaceful settlement of pre-conflict situations and conflicts could be applied between the OSCE States and its non-participating neighbouring countries, if

the parties to a conflict agree. There is no reason not to apply the OSCE wisdom to its adjacent regions. In the area of the OSCE's CSBMs, certain measures could be applied to the OSCE's neighbouring countries. But an exchange of information would not be applicable since it covers a clear geographical area and reflects a specific security situation in the OSCE space. Useful areas are "risk reduction", "contacts", and "communications". The OSCE States have a computer-based communication network which might include its neighbouring countries for the purpose of risk reduction. The exchange of military information should be conducted between an OSCE State and its direct neighbour. For example, Japan and Russia agreed to work out CSBMs. Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed a Military Confidence Enhancement Agreement on the border region in April 1996. The Open Skies Treaty is not an OSCE product; however, in the future, neighbouring countries may be invited to join. These ideas could be introduced in the Security Model discussion.

At the Meeting of the Permanent Council on 6 March 1997, Mr. Shunji Yanai, Deputy Foreign Minister of Japan, issued a statement. In this statement, he drew attention to Japan's contribution and its distinct status. After explaining Japan's contribution to Bosnia and Herzegovina, he stated: "We seek to maximize the effect of our co-operation through closer and more stable ties with the OSCE (...) Today I would like to urge that our participation in all formal meetings of the OSCE be fully secured, as stipulated in this decision (the Helsinki Summit decision, T.U.), and that our desire for closer ties be taken into account during internal discussions on the status of 'partner states for co-operation'. I venture to repeat that Japan fully shares the basic values of the OSCE and has made significant contributions to its activities. I hope that the participating States will not lose sight of these facts."¹⁵ The OSCE participating States will be able to benefit from Japan more if they find a concrete and unique status for Japan.

15 REF.PC/139/97, 7 March 1997, Statement by Mr. Shunji Yanai, Deputy Foreign Minister of Japan, at the meeting of the Permanent Council, 6 March 1997.