

## The Small States and the OSCE<sup>1</sup>

### *Definition of OSCE "Small States"*

Small states do not constitute a self-declared group within the OSCE. Any criterion for distinguishing them from medium-sized or large states is hard to come up with and more or less arbitrary. One possibility is to use *population*. A limit of 100,000 residents, for example, would include only the so-called *micro-states* such as Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and the Holy See.<sup>2</sup> With a limit of 1,000,000 residents Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus would be added; two million would bring in Estonia and Slovenia; three million Macedonia, Latvia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina; four million Albania, Armenia, Ireland and Lithuania. Thus a limit of one million residents would seem to make sense for an investigation devoted to small states of the OSCE, even though broader criteria are sometimes applied within the OSCE itself.

This yields nine states for the purposes of this analysis, namely (listed by descending size of population - in thousands): Cyprus (860), Luxembourg (414), Malta (375), Iceland (278), Andorra (64), Monaco (30), Liechtenstein (28), San Marino (25), and the Holy See (or Vatican: 1).<sup>3</sup> This represents 16.4 per cent of the total number of participating States but, with just over two million residents, only two thousandths of the total population of the OSCE. Therefore, along with the five micro-states cited, there are four others which with the exception of Luxembourg are all islands - Iceland, Malta and Cyprus.

*Per capita income*, measured in terms of GDP, is not always available. Roughly, it can be said that all of the countries under discussion here, with the exception of the Mediterranean island states of Malta and Cyprus, reach or exceed the limit of US-Dollars 20,000 per year p.c. and thus belong to the prosperous states. With US-Dollars 37,930 p.c., and as the wealthiest country in the European Union, Luxembourg takes first place. Apart from the Holy See, the micro-states, as providers of financial and (in the case of San Marino) other services, are economically successful despite their structural disadvantage due to their small size. Malta, by contrast, has US-Dollars 13,000 per year p.c. and Cyprus, with US-Dollars 11,600 p.c. is the poorest country in the group.

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- 1 I am indebted to Heinrich Schneider for critical comments.
  - 2 All figures from: *The 55 Participating States - Facts and Figures*, in the present volume, pp. 661-676; see also: Internet pages of the OSCE, <http://www.osce.org> (OSCE Secretariat in Vienna).
  - 3 If Montenegro were to secede from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia it would, with its population of approximately 700,000 people, also belong to this group.

To illustrate in a general way the extent to which these states participate in international politics we shall begin by citing their *membership* in important international organizations since 1945 and the number of their embassies. Luxembourg is the most strongly integrated. It has been a member of the UN, NATO, Council of Europe, WEU, and EC/EU since each of these institutions was founded. Iceland has been a member of the UN since 1946, of NATO since its founding in 1949, of the Council of Europe since 1950, of EFTA since its founding in 1960 and of the EEA. In addition it is a member of the Nordic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Council of the Baltic Sea States. After gaining independence in 1960, Cyprus joined the United Nations and, in 1961, the Council of Europe as well as the movement of non-aligned states. Since 1998 it has been among the first group of candidates for admission to the EU. Following independence in 1964 Malta became a member of the United Nations and in 1965 joined the Council of Europe as well as the movement of non-aligned states in 1973. It reactivated its application for EU membership following the change of government in 1997. There are clear differences in the micro-states. It was not until 1978 that Liechtenstein joined the Council of Europe, the United Nations in 1990, EFTA in 1991 and the EEA in 1995. San Marino became a member of the Council of Europe in 1988 and of the UN in 1992. Monaco was accepted into the United Nations in 1993, two months before Andorra, and has applied for membership to the Council of Europe. Andorra, for its part, has been a member of the Council of Europe since 1994. The Holy See is not a member of these organizations but has observer status. Having sent observers to individual sessions of the UN since the organization's beginning, it established itself as a permanent observer in 1964. Agreement was reached in 1962 on membership in a subordinate organization of the Council of Europe, the "Council for Cultural Co-operation"; and in 1970 a permanent observer was assigned to the organization as a whole and to the European Community as well.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to such memberships, the number of *embassies* a country has serves as an indication of its political involvement. The larger states have a limited but well-established network of relationships with the great powers, international organizations, and neighbouring states: Cyprus has 30, Luxembourg 21, Malta 18 and Iceland, owing to its location on the margin, 16 embassies and missions.<sup>5</sup> The micro-states, by contrast, limit their relations essentially to their important neighbours and to international organizations such as the Council of Europe, the United Nations and also the OSCE with their opportunities for multilateral contacts; otherwise for the most part they main-

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4 Cf. Heribert Köck, *Die völkerrechtliche Stellung des Heiligen Stuhls - Dargestellt an seinen Beziehungen zu Staaten und internationalen Organisationen* [The Position of the Holy See under International Law - Illustrated by its Relations with States and International Organizations], Berlin 1975, pp. 729-748.

5 Status of information ca. mid-1999.

tain multiple accreditations. Thus Liechtenstein and San Marino each have seven embassies or missions, Monaco five and Andorra two. The Holy See constitutes an exception here as its system of ambassadorial nunciatures, which have existed since the Middle Ages in all countries with a Catholic section of the population and in international organizations, has come to encompass 111 such representations.

#### *Small States' Participation in the OSCE*

In 1995 all States that had been participating in the CSCE in 1994 became participating States in the OSCE. The group of CSCE participants emerged in the course of preparations for the first conference. In 1969, following the Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Pact, notes were sent to all European states (plus the United States and Canada) asking for their views on a project for a "Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe". Micro-states were also included, mainly because of a desire on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries to strengthen the neutrality element. The only condition for entry was that each state has a foreign policy of its own. This was in contrast to e.g. the Soviet Union policy in the period between the wars when it had blocked Liechtenstein's application to join the League of Nations because it was not big enough. In 1969 the recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state was not the only problem. The recognition of micro-states was also an issue and for that reason it was their aim to participate in this initiative to the greatest extent they could.<sup>6</sup> Two months later, when Finland sent out invitations to participate in multilateral preparatory talks in Helsinki, a number of small and micro-states - *Luxembourg, Iceland, Cyprus, Malta*, as well as *Liechtenstein* and *San Marino* - were included as participants on the invitation list from the very beginning. *Monaco* did not at first take part in the CSCE preparations but sought participation before the start of the actual Final Conference in Helsinki in 1975. *Andorra* was not included at that time because France was responsible for its foreign policy and it did not join the OSCE until 25 April 1996.<sup>7</sup>

The *Holy See* also received the above mentioned note in 1969 through the Hungarian Embassy in Rome after the meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries, and thereafter the Finnish invitation as well. It responded to both and has been one of the participants ever since. While the Holy See seeks only observer status in many international organizations, its participation in the CSCE and then OSCE can be traced back to the particular historic situation

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6 Cf. Mario Graf von Ledebur-Wicheln, *Die Mitwirkung in der OSZE - Kollektive Vernetzung oder Partnerschaft in der Sicherheit* [Collaboration in the OSCE - Collective Networking or Partnership in Security], Vaduz 1996, pp. 94-116 (Special Printing from: Papers of the Liechtenstein Institute No. 11).

7 Cf. John J. Maresca, *To Helsinki. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973-1975*, Durham 1985, p. 3.

of 1969. The fact that both the League of Nations and the United Nations, as organizations for the peaceful settlement of conflicts, had been designed without the participation of the Holy See also played a role. The CSCE gave the Holy See an opportunity, which corresponded with its own image as a peace-seeking body, to pursue its interests in the process of détente and peaceful conflict resolution.<sup>8</sup>

The Holy See has been a subject of international law since the early Middle Ages, independently of the Pope's position as sovereign of the Papal State. When the latter was dissolved in 1870 and absorbed into Italy, the Holy See's status as a subject of international law was upheld, as can be witnessed through its maintenance of embassies and conclusion of treaties (concordats). The Lateran Treaty of 1929 established the Vatican City as a state, although one with minimal territory. Its citizenship is held only by long-time employees and residents of the Vatican, members of the Roman curia, and Vatican diplomats. The Holy See itself has no citizens. Its specifically religious and humanitarian objectives are unique, similar to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and in contrast to nation states. For this reason people speak of a particular or special status of the Holy See as subject of international law.<sup>9</sup>

With regard to its position in international organizations, whether as member or as observer, after 1929 the Holy See adopted the policy of acting in its capacity as Holy See when church questions were involved and otherwise it acted as the Vatican. In 1957, however, an exchange of correspondence with the United Nations Secretariat led to a fundamental decision. Henceforth, Vatican representation was limited to technical organizations such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the World Postal Union (WPU) with facilities actually based in Vatican City. In all other cases, involving numerous organizations of a cultural, social, humanitarian or scientific character - or economic or disarmament issues - it acts as the Holy See.<sup>10</sup> Generally it takes the status of an observer in order to emphasize its strictly apolitical position. There have been two exceptions, however: its membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which came about at the express wish of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in 1956, and its participation in the CSCE/OSCE.

#### *Formal Participation of Small States in the OSCE*

*Contributions to the OSCE budget* are not so much determined by a specific blueprint as through reaching a consensus with each state. During the CSCE

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8 Cf. Köck, cited above (Note 4), p. 475, Footnote 85.

9 Cf. Alfred Verdross/Bruno Simma, *Universelles Völkerrecht - Theorie und Praxis* [Universal International Law - Theory and Practice], Berlin 1983 (3rd Ed.), p. 247ff.

10 Cf. Köck, cited above (Note 4), p. 764ff.

period when its budget was lower, all small states (with the exception of Andorra) contributed 0.2 per cent. Only Luxembourg made a larger contribution of 0.6 per cent. After July 1992, and thus after it grew substantially from 34 to (at the time) 52 participating States, further budget differentiations were made within the group of small states. Beginning in January 1998, with a rising budget that currently lies at 30-50 million Euros (1999), the contributions were as follows: Luxembourg 0.55 per cent, Iceland and Cyprus 0.19 per cent each, Malta and the micro-states (including Andorra) 0.125 per cent. For the exceptionally high budget of the large missions such as those to Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, which came to about 130 million Euros in 1998, a separate contributions key was worked out to take effect in January 2000: it stipulates that Luxembourg contribute 0.63 per cent, Iceland 0.21, Cyprus 0.14, and the micro-states and Malta 0.02 per cent each.

The *size of its Permanent Mission to the OSCE* varies according to the importance and the interests of each country. The Luxembourg Mission currently comprises three or four people one of whom is responsible for military matters. During Luxembourg's EU Presidency in the second half of 1997 it rose as high as seven. The Malta Mission comprises two people, Cyprus one or two. Iceland has had one permanent representative in Vienna since 1 March 1999; before that its OSCE affairs were handled by the Embassy in Bonn. Liechtenstein, by contrast, has kept a rather high profile; it maintains one or two people in Vienna. The Holy See has three representatives in its Mission, one of them a regular Vatican diplomat and on certain occasions two Austrians. San Marino has two people who when necessary travel up from San Marino; Monaco has one from its Embassy to the European Union (and Belgium) in Brussels; and Andorra has one person who travels from Andorra. Primarily this means the last three participate in Summit Meetings every two or three years and in annual meetings of the Ministerial Council; more rarely they take part in the (usually) weekly meetings of the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation although San Marino is represented there somewhat more frequently than the others.

The most important OSCE institution is its *Chairmanship*. During the CSCE period the rotation principle prevailed. Once the transition to the OSCE had taken place a decision-making procedure based on consensus evolved and countries could announce their candidacy for this position. Interestingly enough, with the exception of Germany in the second half of 1991 and Italy in 1994, the chairmanship has mostly been held by mid-sized states such as Sweden, Hungary, Switzerland, Denmark, Poland, Norway and Austria and not, as far as can be predicted through the year 2002, any country from the group of small states. Nevertheless, judging by its successful management in its EU Presidency, Luxembourg could provide good leadership for the OSCE. Of the various OSCE bodies, there is one - the *Forum for Security Co-operation* - where the chairmanship continues to rotate. From the first session on 22 September 1992 until mid-June 1999 there were 262 sessions (including,

since 1994, the annual review conferences of the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures).<sup>11</sup> Until the end of 1994 there was a separate chairman for each session; since 1 January 1995 there has been a monthly rotation. If a country does not want to take the chair it falls to the next in order. Taking on this job can therefore be regarded as a certain indicator of commitment. During this period Luxembourg has held the chair six times, Cyprus five (the last in March 1996), Malta three (last in 1997) and Iceland once (1993). The four micro-states, on the other hand, have not held the chair once. Though, there are other countries that have been similarly inactive, e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Latvia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. But this does not mean complete inactivity. In a country such as Latvia, national diplomacy is focused on the issue of membership in the EU so that there are few resources left for other institutions. During the earlier CSCE period the Holy See took over the chairmanship but has not appeared in this office since 1992.

The OSCE itself does not yet have the authority to make contracts as an international organization. The first step towards this legal status was the decision regarding the *Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE* of 1992. The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration sits in Geneva. As of 1 April 1998, 33 countries had signed the Convention and there were 21 ratifications, among these many small states have ratified, namely Cyprus (1994), Liechtenstein (1994), Monaco (1994) and San Marino (1995). Three small states have only signed: Luxembourg (1992), Malta (1992), and Iceland (1994). Andorra and the Holy See have as yet made no move to support the Convention, but neither have such important OSCE participating States like the United States and Great Britain.

Finally, the *Parliamentary Assembly* of the OSCE deserves mention. It was constituted in 1991, still in connection with the CSCE. Of 317 delegates (since 1998) Luxembourg (like Bulgaria) has supplied five, Cyprus, Iceland and Malta three each (like fifteen other countries including the Baltic states and the Caucasian countries, four out of five Yugoslav successor states as well as three Central Asian countries, plus Albania and Moldova) while Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and Andorra send two delegates each. The Holy See sends two representatives with the status of guest delegates.

#### *Small States and OSCE Groups*

At the present time there are two main identifiable *groups* in the OSCE: the European Union, sometimes including several or all of its candidates for membership, and the GUAM Group, made up of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Occasionally there are also statements or proposals "on behalf of the 16" or, now, "on behalf of the 19" (this refers to NATO, although

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11 Cf. OSCE FSC (Forum for Security Co-operation) Journal 1/1992ff.

the term is not used). Half of the small states, namely, Cyprus, Malta, Liechtenstein and San Marino (along with the neutral countries, Finland, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland as well as the bloc-free Yugoslavia) had also belonged to the former CSCE group of "neutral and non-aligned" (N+N) countries.<sup>12</sup> The Holy See also takes a position of neutrality on security matters but it did not belong to any group, not even that of the "N+N", because as a matter of principle it seeks to avoid biased positions.

The "N+N" group fell apart after the outbreak of the internal Yugoslav war with the attack on Slovenia and the consequent activation of the CSCE crisis mechanism by Austria on 1 July 1991. Initially Yugoslavia received strong support from Cyprus and some from Malta while the other countries in the group, Liechtenstein and San Marino among them, supported Austria's move. A year later the CSCE suspended the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Thus the group of nine small states that are under discussion here constitute no more than a formal category and have nothing in common apart from their size. However, since 1985 the "Small Country Games" have been initiated. All small states participate in these athletic games except the Holy See. This could be viewed as the beginning of a non-political group consciousness.

#### *The Countries in Detail - Their Role and de facto Participation in the OSCE*

The underlying principle of the CSCE, as of the OSCE, is that in it sovereign states deal with each other on a basis of equality, even if there are substantial differences in the amount of influence they have. Maresca noted in the case of the first CSCE that micro-states had a hard time fulfilling their role completely. However, small mid-sized countries such as Denmark were able to achieve formal equality, even with the superpowers. Nonetheless, a number of very impressive diplomats came from small countries which, owing to their size and the size of their delegations - sometimes only one or two diplomats - had to be up-to-date on all negotiations. Countries like Malta, the Holy See, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Iceland were sometimes able to make vitally important contributions to the work of the Conference. In the OSCE the extent and direction of the work has changed, which now will be discussed here country by country.<sup>13</sup>

*Luxembourg* is strongly integrated in regional organizations by virtue of its membership in the EU and NATO. These memberships mean that it is involved in many consultation mechanisms and participates regularly in decision-making processes - although this is not always noticeable to those from the outside. It also serves as NATO spokesman in regular rotation. A par-

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12 Cf. Hanspeter Neuhold, *The Group of the N+N Countries Within the CSCE Process*, in: Hanspeter Neuhold (Ed.), *CSCE: N+N Perspectives. The Process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe from the Viewpoint of the Neutral and Non-Aligned Participating States*, Vienna 1987, pp. 23-35.

13 Cf. Maresca, cited above (Note 7), p. 18.

ticular high point occurs when Luxembourg holds the EU Presidency. As a consequence - and not only based on the size of its delegation - it clearly needs to be viewed as the most active and influential member of the group of small states. In financial terms it is even, on a *per capita* basis, the biggest contributor to the OSCE. The absolute size of its contributions puts it in nineteenth place, ahead of such populous countries as Ukraine and Portugal!

*Iceland* is characterized especially by its position as an island on the margin in the North Atlantic. Its membership in NATO is particularly important because of the big military base at Keflavik. Iceland does not maintain military forces of its own. Another special feature is its dependency on the fishing industry which still accounts for 75 per cent of its foreign trade. It is traditionally a democratic country and supports the values of the OSCE but otherwise takes a very reserved stance. Iceland had already sent a Mission to Vienna in 1992/93 after the decision to transform the CSCE into the OSCE was made in principle. However, because of budget reductions the Mission had to be transferred back to the Icelandic Embassy in Bonn. Following an economic recovery in more recent years, the Mission in Vienna was reopened in 1999. Iceland is traditionally oriented towards the United States on security matters. It has a bilateral agreement with the US and tends to follow the NATO line rather than the OSCE line. Because it is a member of EEA its positions are assessed informally by the EU.

The position of *Cyprus* in the OSCE as an island in the eastern Mediterranean is strongly coloured by the conflict between the Greek and Turkish populations on that island and by Turkish military support for its ethnic population in northern Cyprus since 1974 (the putsch of the Greek-Cypriot national guard and the Turkish invasion). This has overshadowed its participation in the CSCE since its origin and both sides make statements and accusations with almost ritual frequency. However, this kind of behaviour has become less common since the advent of the OSCE. And yet despite a number of attempts at mediation there is no solution in sight. Division of the island into two independent states has not been internationally accepted and as a consequence only the Greek-Cypriot government and not that of the Turkish Cypriots is recognized. The intervention of a mid-sized power against a small state continues. Indeed, there seems at present to be a tendency towards more rather than less armament, as can be seen from the planned purchase of Russian air-defence missiles by the Greek-Cypriot side. It is regrettable that the OSCE (like the CSCE before it) has the necessary instruments for peaceful conflict settlement but these are not being accepted in the present case. Thus the strength of the Turkish forces in the north is not known and there is no notification of larger military operations in advance. Confidence-building measures do not work and are characterized by the Cypriot side as "sunny weather manoeuvres".<sup>14</sup>

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14 See, from the Greek-Cypriot side: Thalia F. Petrides (Ed.), *Security of Smaller States*, Nicosia 1996 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

*Malta* is a relatively active participating State as can be seen from its role as host at or as a name-giver for important meetings and for one of the four mechanisms, the so-called Valletta Mechanism for the "peaceful settlement of disputes". Malta is also a prototype for the astonishing influence of a small state in the CSCE. Since the creation of the CSCE it has seen itself as the representative of the interests of the "Mediterranean Forum" (members, in addition to Malta: Egypt, Algeria, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria since 1977, but most of the time inactive, and Jordan since 1998). This Forum called for tying the knot between European and Mediterranean security tighter.

During the preparations for the first conference (1969 on) both of the superpowers had initially agreed that no enlargement of the agenda or of the group of participants would be permitted. In 1975, however, by using its veto, Malta succeeded in having the Mediterranean question made an important ancillary subject. In the Helsinki Final Act, at Malta's insistence, an additional chapter on "Questions Relating to Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean" was fitted in after the "second basket".<sup>15</sup> Also, by 1993 four special CSCE conferences on issues related to the Mediterranean area had taken place.

Malta owes this success, among other things, to support from other Mediterranean countries such as Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Spain and Italy.<sup>16</sup> However, Malta was not able to impose its will on the issue of (non-voting) participation by the Mediterranean Forum countries, and its blockading tactics occasionally risked placing it in fairly serious isolation. Even so, five countries on the Mediterranean littoral - Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia (Syria showed little interest despite its participation in the group) - succeeded (even before the start of the OSCE) in March 1994 in getting invited to meetings of the OSCE Ministerial Council, review conferences and regular meetings of the OSCE Troika. They were also given access to all OSCE documents along with the right to present their views to the OSCE Chairman. In the same year an open-ended Contact Group on expert level was set up within the framework of the Permanent Council to facilitate the exchange of information. In 1995 the name of these states was changed from "non-participating Mediterranean States" to "Mediterranean partners for co-operation". Since 1997 the primary issues for Malta have been its orientation towards Europe and its (renewed) application for EU membership. It is seeking, through the screening process, to move up into the first group of candidates. As this goes on it is being increasingly associated with the relevant EU consultation mechanisms.

*Liechtenstein* sought as early as 1969 to become a CSCE participant in order to bolster its sovereignty. It has made a name for itself in the CSCE and

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15 See Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, 1 August 1975, in: Arie Bloed (Ed.) *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993*, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1993, pp. 141-217, here: pp. 182-183.

16 Cf. Maresca, cited above (Note 7), pp. 101 and 220.

OSCE and is quite active. While in the early stages of the CSCE it was occasionally represented by Switzerland, the process as a whole brought about a foreign policy emancipation which found expression, among other things, in it being the only micro-state (apart from the Holy See) to find permanent presence (from 1993 on) in Vienna. As is shown by its membership in other international organizations, Liechtenstein is in a sense leading the way among the micro-states when it comes to pursuing an independent foreign policy. As a member of the EEA it is included in the informal consultation mechanism of the EU. During the Cold War it gave extensive support to dissidents in the East Bloc countries. Since 1989 and within the OSCE it has taken a position favouring the strengthening of human rights and the protection of small states. It has also participated in the discussion of a Security Charter and in special financing actions.<sup>17</sup>

The *Holy See* and its special position in international politics as well as the development of its participation in the CSCE have already been dealt with. Regarding votes of a political nature the Holy See made clear in 1972 and again in May 1992 that it did not wish to take a partisan position but that its non-participation in a vote did not denote rejection and was not intended to stand in the way of consensus.<sup>18</sup> In the course of the transformation into the OSCE an intensification of Holy See involvement was also evident in the establishment of a Permanent Mission in Vienna. Its basic approach during the Cold War was to focus on the contents of "basket III" and on the seventh principle, "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief". While almost all other states pursued a variety of objectives and were forced to enter into compromises in order to achieve results, the Holy See was able to put forward its demands, particularly for freedom of religion and freely exercising religion, without the risk of any such limitations.

The Holy See took an intermediate position in the controversial debate over human rights between East and West. The West was fighting above all for liberal freedoms while the East was arguing for static fundamental social rights such as education and work. In many of these discussions the Holy See made the case for balancing these two kinds of human rights. In the field of international relations the Holy See takes a strictly neutral position, for the most part opposed to economic embargoes and the breaking off of diplomatic relations. Should the OSCE decide to support all decisions of the UN Security Council, this would be a complicating factor for the Holy See. In connection with the conflicts in former Yugoslavia it did, however, speak out for

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17 Cf. Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein - Amt für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten [Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein - Office of Foreign Affairs], Zielsetzungen und Prioritäten der liechtensteinischen Aussenpolitik. Bestandesaufnahme, Perspektiven, Schwerpunkte [Objectives and Priorities of Liechtenstein's Foreign Policy - Stock-taking, Outlook, Points of Focus], Vaduz 1997, pp. 16-23.

18 Cf. Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, Helsinki, 8 June 1973, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 15), pp. 121-140, here: p. 140; and Eleventh CSO Meeting, Helsinki, 18-21 May 1992, in: *ibid.*, pp. 941-946, here p. 941.

sanctions as an ultimate response to massive violations of human rights. The recent discussion of democracy and democratization finds only a qualified advocate in the Holy See whose church structures are occasionally lacking in democratic elements. The last Council and the Holy See have, however, issued a clear statement favouring democracy and the rule of law as a form of political order. The Holy See is quite active in the OSCE, mainly in connection with human rights and religious issues, and its occasional positions on security matters and conflicts always emphasize the moral dimension (willingness to reconsider, etc.).

*San Marino, Monaco and Andorra* have no Missions of their own at the OSCE. Although there are variations, they generally have less of a presence, the first two mainly at meetings of the Ministerial Council and at Summit Meetings. By contrast, Andorra, which was admitted in 1996, has hardly made an appearance; its foreign relations had been represented by France. The three countries undertake almost no initiatives. During the CSCE San Marino was occasionally represented by Italy, Monaco by France. Historically, San Marino has a stronger independent political tradition by virtue of its Republicanism, which it has been practising without interruption since 1243, and its attention to refugees, e.g. Garibaldi and his supporters in 1849 and during the Second World War. Monaco, on the other hand, has been oriented more towards its ruling house, the Grimaldi; its first constitution dates from 1911 (for purposes of comparison, Liechtenstein's first constitution is from 1862). It was not until 1993 that Andorra transformed the path of long-standing autonomy for its valleys, established its own constitution and became a member of the UN. For all of them the CSCE process brought about foreign policy emancipation, as can be seen from their membership in international organizations. San Marino and Monaco are linked to the EU Economic Area through bilateral agreements with Italy and France, but Andorra is not a member.

### *Summary*

Generally speaking, it is fair to say that Luxembourg takes first place among the small OSCE States when measured by its level of activity in the Organization, followed by Malta and Cyprus. Then follows a group of three countries: Iceland, which is rather reserved, Liechtenstein and the Holy See - the latter's activity limited by its emphasis on the analysis of the ethical and moral aspects of OSCE projects and on religious and humanitarian issues. Last come San Marino, Monaco and Andorra, which have not established Missions of their own and therefore have a weak presence. The first two have, however, been in the Organization since its origins while Andorra is just beginning to give form to its participation.

Beyond that it is worth noting that the OSCE offers to the larger of the small states a favourable opportunity to show the flag and call attention to their interests. As for the micro-states (apart from the Holy See), it enables them to demonstrate their existence.

Vulnerability and flexibility are important characteristics of small states. International organizations offer a measure of protection and for that reason are supported by such states. However, the concept of small state roles has been changing in the course of the CSCE/OSCE process and has become more like that of larger states.