

Introduction

The reader is currently in possession of the fifth Yearbook on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Each of its predecessors was accompanied, at least tacitly, by the wish and expectation on the part of the editors and editorial staff that peaceful co-existence on the European Continent would be strengthened by the growing institutionalization of a co-operative security policy. Unfortunately this has remained a wish, and even recently one could not hope for fulfilment.

At the end of the day, the OSCE has not been able to strengthen security and co-operation as planned. And as a result, it has in itself become weaker. In the last Yearbook we wrote that the strength of the OSCE could be seen in the three relationships on which it rests: namely, the relationships with its participating States, with its field of responsibilities and with other organizations. The path into the Kosovo war, the course of that war, and the arrangements to put an end to it changed all three relationships to the detriment of the OSCE. In October 1998 it appeared that the sudden possibility of a return to Kosovo represented by the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) would turn the OSCE into a dam providing deliverance from the growing avalanche of violence threatening to suffocate South-eastern Europe. This hope for the success of a policy combining crisis management with prevention, nourished by considerable effort, continued until mid-March 1999 to hold its own against an attitude of pessimistic fatalism and moral voluntarism which sought to meet violence only with counter-violence. Despite the fact that OSCE participating States were slow in launching it, the unarmed KVM was actually able to prevent smaller conflicts, reduce violence and create confidence. However, this did not lead to moderation of nationalistic fears, expectations and speculations in either the Kosovo-Albanian or Serbian camps nor did it contribute to a consensus at the negotiations of Rambouillet and Paris. Without a decision by the OSCE Permanent Council, it was determined that this huge Mission, established in a complicated roundabout manner and progressively expanding, should be withdrawn. Thus the field was opened to the bombers and the massive expulsion of the Kosovo-Albanian population which followed. As a result a co-operative approach to security was given up in favour of confrontation. From March until June 1999 NATO took over the leadership of European security policy and, within this "lead organization", the United States, as "lead nation", set the course of action. At first this course was declared preventive but when it became clear it was to be unsuccessful, they reclassified their campaign into a repressive move against the political leadership in Belgrade through military intervention which became a burden to the civilian population. Even this change in course was not suc-

cessful. It was 70 days and nights before the Finnish-Russian mediation, with the support of the governments of the member States of the European Union, persuaded the Yugoslav government to make concessions. In addition to NATO, the United Nations subsequently entered the picture and under its leadership the OSCE was asked to fulfil a subordinate stabilizing function - precisely the opposite of what had been foreseen in the Rambouillet draft agreement of early 1999.

Thus this Yearbook covers a span of time which saw the most serious break in the continuous development of European security policy since 1990. The OSCE contributed to this cleft and was also damaged by it. On the one hand, it appeared to be an independent constant in the Balkan game, on the other it was a dependent variable. The policy of co-operation, developed with much effort, has suffered such a setback that diplomats are talking about a policy of co-existence within the framework of the negotiations on a European Security Charter. Was this setback inevitable or could it have been avoided? There are opposing views. What are the consequences of this? Along with the losers of a war there are also winners who have gained a distinct advantage.

What we see here is a renewal of nationalism, of polarized thinking, and even a renaissance in the concept of a "just war". The ceiling on the employment of military force has been lowered. Calls for the enlargement of military budgets have become louder and everywhere one hears talk of "modernizing" of military forces. It would be no more than an act of consistency to return to calling the defence ministries by their old names. There is no doubt that the coalition of hit men, sheriffs, "hawks" and crusaders, along with the reservists left over from the Cold War, are on the winning side. In addition there are many private parties who would profit at the expense of the public: to be more precise, at the expense of the individual taxpayer when it comes to the re-procurement of the weapons and ammunition and the reconstruction of destroyed houses, bridges, roads, and supply facilities. The promise of the so-called Stability Pact for the Balkans - which admittedly is meant to extend much farther than Kosovo - has already mobilized businessmen and investors in Western Europe and overseas.

It is obvious that the "only world power" (Brzezinski) has also gained the advantage and that in the process the "Euro-Atlantic" power relationship has once again been shifted. As a consequence, damage has been done to NATO's pan-European claim through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to be a competitor of the OSCE. If NATO policy (as policy-makers acknowledged) was intended at first as a preventive approach through the use of threats and thereafter direct intervention then it has failed. And it continues to fail following the end of the attacks and the return of the refugees. Even now, in the guise of the KFOR, NATO has not been able to prevent continuing terrorist expulsions of people from their homes nor their murder - with the Serbs and Roma as the current victims. By supporting the KLA it is even facilitating (*nolens volens?*) the secession of Kosovo from Yugoslavia. However a

secession would not only be contrary to the declared goals of current European security policy but also to the principles of the European community of states repeatedly reaffirmed since the Final Act of Helsinki a quarter century ago.

As a consequence of the Kosovo war there are also disintegrative tendencies that can be seen beyond Kosovo borders, particularly in Montenegro and the neighbouring state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is precisely here that there has been a setback in the initial progress towards the much invoked "civil society" which the "international community", including the OSCE, had with great effort only recently achieved. As former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl presciently said, the victims of today will be the offenders of tomorrow.

In this Yearbook the reader has before him the evidence of five years of research on the development of pan-European security policy as practised by the OSCE. This lustrum provides us with an occasion for some modest reflection. First, a few statistics to illustrate the extent and variety of the publication.

The five volumes¹ contain 2,363 pages of reading material on the OSCE; each volume has around 550 pages, about 430 of them consisting of chapters written expressly for the Yearbook and 120 devoted to OSCE documents, each time including the Annual Report of the Secretary General. 133 authors contributed to these five volumes; 48 from Germany, 85 from foreign countries, most of them from OSCE States ranging from Canada to Uzbekistan and from Turkey to Estonia. Egyptian and Japanese authors are also represented.

Of the 133 authors, 42 were academics and 91 diplomats, international civil servants and military people. Thus for the most part the authors were not outside observers and analysts but people directly or indirectly involved in positions of responsibility, as consultants, designers and implementers.

Thanks to this input, the Yearbook has made good on its claim to be focused on actual practice and current issues. And it has always been up-to-date but without a narrow concentration on the events of a given year. Thus it has remained a "Yearbook" in the double sense that it is both a problem-oriented chronicle of the year and a periodical on issues of current interest which appears once a year.

The structure of the Yearbook has been retained throughout the five year period, a structure which has emerged from procedural logic - situations, instruments, organizational aspects - and in particular from the responsibilities of the OSCE as a preventive security institution with a variety of dimensions. Most of the articles are descriptive in character, often followed by an analysis. Some essays in diary form have even been included. In whatever form the contents have been presented, it was hope that each article could be used

1 The English OSCE Yearbook 1995/1996, volume No. 1/2, is identical with the German-language Yearbook 1996 supplemented by some articles of the 1995 edition.

as a resource for scientific research. The Yearbooks also contain thoughtful studies on the historical, institutional and legal evaluation of security policy generally and of the OSCE in particular. But no papers were accepted restricted entirely to the theoretical framework of international relations.

Thanks to the financial and political independence of the editor and his partners in co-operation, the editorial staff has always had creative freedom. It has not felt that its autonomy was in any way curtailed by the fact that it has always successfully sought a relationship of trust with the OSCE Secretariat and the delegations of the participating States - a fact which found expression, among other things, in contributions to the Yearbook by the Secretary General and the various Chairmen-in-Office.

The Yearbooks appear in English and Russian, as well as German, thus reaching the largest possible circle of interested readers. Among these, as always, are the various groups that make up the "OSCE community": on the one hand those active in the field such as diplomats, politicians and security policy experts and on the other observers such as journalists, political scientists, peace researchers and students.

Thus it has remained the main task of the Yearbook to spread knowledge, promote insights, exercise criticism of conditions that promote conflict, and offer ideas for policies to further the cause of peace.

There is even more reason to pursue this objective now that the development of the OSCE as a normative and operational security regime has turned out not to be a "given", as it would have seemed between the Helsinki Summit of 1992 and that of Budapest in 1994, when the idea for producing this Yearbook was born. For, as was stated at the beginning of this introduction, the OSCE has suffered its "career setback". The results and the course of the Istanbul Summit, along with the successes of the missions' work, will show in coming months whether the OSCE can recover its upward course.